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Accompanying with rapid urbanization and hectic real estate development market in China, 
the urban fringe area becomes the most dynamic area, giving rise to academic scrutiny of 
peri-urbanization phenomenon. Due to the unique rural-urban dichotomy of land system in 
China, development in peri-urban areas especially involves land ownership and use right 
transfer issue. Given the constantly changing institutions and players in rural land 
development market, studies on the informal institutions underlying current market situation 
and the actual property rights arrangement is of great importance, which is also the motivation 
of this research.  
 
The aim of this research is to carry out an empirical investigation on the land development 
process of a peri-urban area through a case study, and further derive insights on the informal 
institutions and evolving property rights system on the rural land. Thus the objectives of this 
research are: (1) based on empirical study on the rural land development process, find out 
various development types, and the characteristics of each type in terms of being formal or 
otherwise; (2) Discover the main actors, relationship between them and strategic behavior by 
each actor, the formal and informal institutions regarding land development process; and (3) 
delineate the arrangement of property rights system over the rural land among different actors 




Using land acquisition data from a typical peri-urban town case in Beijing and especially 29 
commodity housing projects, this research finds that power balance and interaction among the 
land users, developers and the state were always structured by the property rights regime. 
There are various forms of land development, in terms of land transfer and approval grants, as 
well as various developers. Ambiguity in property rights is the driving force of rapid 
peri-urbanization. It has been revealed in this research that rural land development of Beiqijia 
Town was structured by the ambiguous legal ownership of rural land by the rural collectives, 
weak land use rights of the nominal land owners, indetermination of inter-government power 
allocation as well as the evolution of the property rights structures. The power of township 
government was actually enhanced as the China Communist Party built the government 
power deep into rural areas. Combining with the cadre management and assessment system, 
the township officials become pro-growth and actively pursue revenue from land development. 
The land development and transfer rights are consistent along with the government power 










LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the dissertation                                           5 
Figure 3.1: The administration evolution of rural area after the reform                 23                
Figure 3.2 State policies on agricultural – construction land conversion in different periods 28 
Figure 3.3 New regulations on rural-urban land conversion from 1999                 29 
Figure 3.4: Formal process of land apportionment in China                          30 
Figure 3.5 Formal approval process of a development project                        31 
Figure 3.6 Land Markets in China                                              31 
Figure 3.7: Rural land expropriation approved by municipal government in the 1990s     34 
Figure 4.1 Land Coverage change in Beijing from 1950-2000                        37 
Figure 4.2 Population growth rates of various areas of Beijing from 1950-2000          38 
Figure 4.3: Geographical Location of Beiqijia Town                               39 
Figure 4.4: Beiqijia Location in Changping County                                39 
Figure 4.5: 21 villages in Beiqijia Town                                         39 
Figure 4.6: GDP growth rate of Beiqijia Town, 1991-2000                          40 
Figure 4.7: GDP structure of Beiqijia Town, 1990-2001                            40 
Figure 4.8: Sectoral GDP structure of Beiqijia Town, 1990-2001                     41 
Figure 4.9 Land use map in Beiqijia Town in 2003                                44 
Figure 4.10: Industrial land use map                                            47 
Figure 4.11 Rural housing land use map                                         52 
 x 
Figure 4.12 Affordable housing land use map                                     55 
Figure 4.13: Commercial housing land use map                                   56 
Figure 5.1: Formal projects distribution                                         78 
Figure 5.2: Illustration of transaction of formal projects                             78 
Figure 5.3: Illustration of transaction of quasi-informal projects                      80  
Figure 5.4: Illustration of land rights transaction in peasant housing rent               84         
Figure 5.5: Illegal projects distribution                                          85 
Figure 5.6: Illustration of land rights transaction in informal commercial projects        88 
Figure 5.7: Illegal projects distribution                                          91 
Figure 5.8: Illustration of the land rights transaction in renting land to external users      91 
Figure 5.9: Comparison between commercial housing projects before and after 1997      92 
 
 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 4.1 The population constitution in Beiqijia Town                           42 
Table 4.2: Land Use in Beiqijia Town in 2003                                   44 
Table 4.3: Categorization according to the land use types in 2003                    44 
Table 4.4: Basic information on the industrial zones in Beiqijia in 2003               47 
Table 4.5: The basic information of industrial land use in 2003                      48 
Table 4.6: Basic Information of Commercial Housing Projects in Beiqijia             58 
Table 4.7 Projects undertaken by indigenous developers                           62 
Table 4.8: Projects undertaken by external developers before 1997                   67 
Table 4.9: Projects undertaken by external developers after 1997                    72 
Table 5.1: Land development legality types in Beiqijia Town                       76 
Table 5.2 Formal projects                                                   77 
Table 5.3: Projects using land approved by the county government                  83 
Table 5.4: Informal projects                                                 86 
Table 5.5: Comparison of projects with different land approvals                     93 
Table 5.6: Employment situation of villagers in Beiqijia Town in 2003                9 
 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background  
 
Rapid urbanization induced by industrialization in Southeast Asia and China has raised wide 
academic scrutiny. Such transformation is characterized by desakota land use pattern (McGee, 
1991) and peri-urbanization process for its urban-rural ambiguity. As Webster (2002) puts it, 
the magnitude and impact of this phenomenon in China is, and will be, more important than 
in any other world region. 
 
The term peri-urbanization refers to a process in which rural areas located on the outskirts of 
established cities become more urban in character, in physical, economic, and social terms, 
often in piecemeal fashion. Large-scale, often haphazard, land conversion occurs and 
infrastructure backlog is one of the major challenges. Typically, peri-urbanization is 
stimulated by an infusion of new investment, generally from outside the local region in 
question, including foreign direct investment. Peri-urban development usually involves rapid 
social change as small agricultural communities are forced to adjust to an urban or industrial 
way of life in a very short time. 
 
China, the new Asian economic growth engine, is in transition from the central planning 
system to a market orientation economy. Accompanying with booming economic 
development, Chinese cities are experiencing urban expansion and restructuring as well, with 
the fringe area as the most dynamic area. Urban reforms brought in land market establishment, 
increasingly marketized urban development process and changes in planning practices, which 
is for the state to intervene the notoriously inefficient land development. On the other hand, 
conventional theories, based on the experience of many developing countries, describe an 
urbanization process where large cities play a dominant role (Zhu, 1999; Sassen, 2000). 
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There are many researches on land conversion in the fringe areas of Beijing based on remote 
sensing images. Urban expansion in the 1980s and 1990s were respectively developments 
along newly built transportation corridors and piecemeal developments between the central 
core and the town centers. The characteristics of patchwork development and mixed land use 
fell into the category of “peri-urbanization”. Curiosity about what drives fundamentally such 
development pattern spurs me to further research.  
 
1.2 Existing and relevant research 
 
The researches pertaining to peri-urbanization are mainly geographical record and modeling from 
the perspective of regional development, such as metropolitan urban growth, growth poles and 
urban diffusion models, etc. (Adell, 1999), where it finds a theoretical place within the broader 
literature on rural-urban interactions and linkages. Mattingly (1999) thinks peri-urban interface is 
notably lacking in institutions and processes to negotiate the resolution of conflicts, but it has not 
theoretical depth.  
 
With the urban development process viewed as the market result of a special commodity, 
buildings or real estate, insightful explanations proliferate. Neo-classical economics holds that 
the real estate market is also one dominated by individuals who behave rationally in 
maximising utilities with preference, with relative prices driving the market towards a 
long-run equilibrium. However, due to the characteristics of heterogeneity, low liquidity, high 
transaction cost and location fixity, the real estate market is notoriously inefficient and the 
neo-classical model is widely criticized (Evan, 1995).  
 
Thus development process approach is put forth to study the forces and their function in 
shaping the urban built environment. The most widely used models in developed capitalist 
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economies include the neo-classical model (Healey, 1991), event sequence model (Gore and 
Nicholson, 1985), agency model (Healey, 1991), structural model (Adams et al., 1997; 
Healey, 1991) and structure-agency model (Healey and Barrett, 1990). The most 
comprehensive structure-agency model suggests that a thorough understanding of the 
development process can be achieved only by linking the strategies, interests and actions of 
various actors with the context of broader social, economic and political processes. 
 
However, Ball (1998) acutely points out that such studies provide useful information but, by 
the nature of their methodology, emphasize the actions of individuals over markets, yet no 
precise definition is given of what constitutes a ‘structure’, an ‘agency’ or an ‘institution’. 
There is no clear theory of institutions and how to study them; rather elements are drawn 
together in ad hoc explanations. And he constructed the structure of provision model, trying 
to incorporate institution into the analysis of development process. He admitted that the 
provision thesis provides a perspective for empirical research rather than a theory of 
explanation (Ball, 1998). 
 
The importance of institutional analysis comes to the fore. Institutions are relatively stable 
sets of widely shared and generally realized expectations about how people will behave in 
particular social, economic, and political circumstances (Weimer, 1997). Two important 
notions are property rights and transaction cost. Property rights are relations among people 
concerning the use of things (Furubotn and Svetizar, 1972), which are considered essential in 
the governance of the real estate market (Fischel, 1985; Webster and Lai, 2003). Zhu (2005) 
holds that the ‘structure’ in the development process thesis is the institution of property rights, 
and elaborates on how socialist institution of people’s landownership has evolved into a new 
form to structure an emerging urban land market.  
 
To date, in spite of drastic institutional change in rural China, there is no institutional research 
on the rural land in China, although Ho (2004) points out the legal ambiguity of property 
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rights. But how various actors react to such ambiguity and economic and institutional changes, 
and how distinctive peri-urbanization occurs, remain unsolved. One possible reason is the 
lack of empirical data, preventing from deeper discussions.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
So this research aims to find out the property rights on rural land during the rural-state 
conversion process and the conceptual foundation for this institutional change. As a result, the 
objectives are: 
(1) Based on empirical study on the rural land development process, find out various 
development types, and characteristics of each type in terms of being formal or otherwise; 
(2) Discover the main actors, relationship between them and strategic behavior by each actor, 
the formal and informal institutions regarding land development process; and  
(3) Delineate the arrangement of property rights system over the rural land among different 
actors involved, and interpret such arrangement from the perspective of institutionalism.  
The research question is thus derived as what the informal development of rural land in 
peri-urban area of Beijing is and what the property rights arrangement among various actors 
is. 
 
1.4 Presentation of the Study 
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Figure 1.1 Structure of the dissertation 
 
 
Chapter 1: introduce the research problem by bringing in the research background and 
existing study of peri-urbanization and land development in China, identify research 
objectives and questions. 
Chapter 2: go through recent theoretical literature in economical and sociological studies 
relevant to land development within a framework fit for this study. 
Chapter 3: introduce the formal institutions over rural land use and their changes over time, 
and approved or unapproved rural land development Beijing during the 1990s. 
Chapter 4: introduction of the study area, way of data collection; go into the details of the 
rural land development types by grouping into the different use and developers. 
Chapter 5: in the framework regarding the legal status of projects, find out the property rights 
arrangement among various actors. 
Chapter 6: conclude the research by summarizing the findings and the driving force and 




Formal Institution on Rural Land Use
Empirical Study
Discussions and Conclusions 
- 6 - 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Peri-urbanization Process 
 
Rapid urbanization induced by industrialization in Southeast Asia and China has raised wide 
academic scrutiny. Such transformation is characterized by desakota land use pattern (McGee, 
1991) and peri-urbanization process for its urban-rural ambiguity. As Webster (2002) put it, 
in East Asia, the magnitude and impact of this phenomenon is, and will be, more important 
than in any other world region. 
 
The term peri-urbanization refers to a process in which rural areas located on the outskirts of 
established cities become more urban in character, in physical, economic, and social terms, 
often in piecemeal fashion. Large-scale, often haphazard, land conversion occurs and 
infrastructure backlog is one of the major challenges. Typically, peri-urbanization is 
stimulated by an infusion of new investment, generally from outside the local region in 
question, including foreign direct investment. Peri-urban development usually involves rapid 
social change as small agricultural communities are forced to adjust to an urban or industrial 
way of life in a very short time. 
 
In spatial terms, Rakodi (1998, as quoted in Adell 1999) defines peri-urban areas as: 
…the transition zone between fully urbanised land in cities and areas in predominantly 
agricultural use. It is characterised by mixed land uses and indeterminate inner and outer 
boundaries, and typically is split between a number of administrative areas. 
 
The peri-urban zone begins just beyond the contiguous built-up urban area and sometimes 
extends as far as 150 km from the core city, or as in the Chinese case as far as 300 km 
(Webster, 2002). The land that can be characterized as peri-urban shifts over time as cities, 
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and the transition zone itself, expand outward. What frequently results is a constantly 
changing mosaic of both traditional and modern land use. Peri-urbanization does not 
necessarily result in an end state that resembles conventional urban or suburban communities. 
 
2.2 Neo-classical Economics Explanation 
 
With urban development process viewed as the market result of a special commodity, 
buildings or real estate, insightful explanations proliferate. Neo-classical economics holds that 
the real estate market is also one dominated by individuals who behave rationally in 
maximising utilities with preference, with relative prices driving the market towards a 
long-run equilibrium. The neo-classical economics regards that markets should be structured 
as the players compete by price and quality. It is firmly believed that free market leads to 
efficiency and prosperity by the function of ‘invisible hands’ (Smith, 1776). 
 
However, the essential assumptions underlying a perfect free market in the neo-classical 
economics rarely apply, especially for the land market. First of all, land supply is limited. 
Also, both land and property are fixed to one location and investment in them requires large 
capital outlays. The concept of land implies a host of external effects, positive as well as 
negative. All these attributes make for a very imperfect market. Moreover, both land and 
property on it are long-lasting assets and the value to the user is dependent on many factors 
which occur outside the plot and are thus beyond the control of the owner or investor 
(Luithlen, 1997). Such externalities make land and property market difficult to gauge. 
 
Thus, due to the characteristics of heterogeneity, low liquidity, high transaction cost and 
location fixity, the real estate market is notoriously inefficient and the neo-classical model is 
widely criticized (Evan, 1995). The land market should not be treated as a black box. 
Particularly, market failure in relation to externalities and in the provision of public goods 
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prompts for an active role of the state in the market. As there is no “free market”, the 
emerging land market in the transitional economy would be structured by institutions and 
regulated by the state.  
 
2.3 Development Process Approach 
 
Given that the land market could not be explained solely by neo-classical economics and the 
local state always plays an important role in urban development, development process 
approach is put forth to study the forces and their function in shaping the urban built 
environment. For a long time, economists, sociologists and planners have tried to give a 
reasonable explanation to the development process by developing all kind of models. 
Academic literature has stressed in recent years the importance of understanding the strategies 
and interests of ‘actors’ and their relationship in the development process (Healey and Barrett, 
1990; Healey, 1991). The most widely used models in developed capitalist economies include 
the neo-classical model (Healey, 1991), event sequence model (Gore and Nicholson, 1985), 
agency model (Healey, 1991), structural model (Adams et al., 1997; Healey, 1991) and 
structure-agency model (Healey and Barrett, 1990). 
 
Based on different theoretical underpinnings, these models themselves have been devised to 
assist research in a variety of contexts. They take different forms, ranging from flow diagrams, 
through sets of relationships between the agents involved, to overall frameworks or structures 
within which land development occurs. In this sense, such models are essentially different 
ways of representing the same thing (Gore and Nicholson, 1991). In fact, different types of 
models offer different levels of understanding (Gore and Nicholson, 1991). The neo-classical 
models, emphasizing that development decisions are made individually within a market 
framework (Healey, 1991); event sequence models, identifying the various stages of the 
development process using the ‘development pipeline’ concept describing the flow of 
- 9 - 
development schemes (Gore and Nicholson, 1985); agency models, focusing on various 
actors such as land-owners, developers, planners and financiers in the development process, 
their roles and the interests that guide their strategies and the interrelationships between them 
(Healey, 1991); structural models, based on theoretical understandings of the structural 
dynamics of land development with a deep root in Marxist economics and urban political 
economy (Adams et al., 1997; Healey, 1991); and structure and agency theory developed by 
Healey and Barrett (1990), suggesting that a thorough understanding of the development 
process can be achieved only by linking the strategies, interests and actions of various actors 
with the context of broader social, economic and political processes.  
 
Based on a critical review of previous research, Gore and Nicholson (1991) conclude that it is 
futile to search for a ‘generally applicable model’ of the development process. Among the 
four categories of approaches reviewed are sequential or descriptive approaches, behaviourial 
or decision-making approaches, production-based approaches and structures-of-provision 
approaches, which accordingly correspond to four of the models stated above—i.e. event 
sequence models, agency models, structural models, and structure and agency theory. It is 
recognised that the development process is so complicated that it cannot be fully understood 
by a single model. Gore and Nicholson (1991) suggest that the principles of the 
structures-of-provision approach are more useful in understanding the development process. 
 
However, Ball (1998) acutely pointed out that such studies provide useful information but, by 
the nature of their methodology, emphasize the actions of individuals over markets, yet no 
precise definition is given of what constitutes a ‘structure’, an ‘agency’ or an ‘institution’. 
There is no clear theory of institutions and how to study them; rather elements are drawn 
together in ad hoc explanations. And he constructed the structure of provision model, trying 
to incorporate institution into the analysis of development process. He admitted that the 
provision thesis provides a perspective for empirical research rather than a theory of 
explanation (Ball, 1998). 
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Ball argued that the structure of provision (SOP) model reconnects agency and structure, 
organizations and markets, in a dynamic, contextual analysis (Guy and Henneberry, 2000). 
According to Ball, ‘Provision’ encompasses the whole gamut of development, construction, 
ownership，use and even health care, etc. Such ‘provision’ is structured by the network of 
organizations and markets involved in a particular form. Organizations and markets were both 
parts of the structure of provision, with two-way influences on each other. According to Ball 
himself, SOP is only a conceptual device for incorporating institutions into analyses of the 
development process. Both neo-classical and Marxist theories have failed to integrate land 
and property in their paradigms.  
 
Study of urban development through an institutional approach offers a new way to 
understanding the forces that shape the building provision in urban area. However, such 
analyses are not subject to much theoretical challenge or empirical testing (Hooper, 1992) and 
failed to offer any deep insight into the mechanisms of market capitalism, or to identify in any 
detail how economic process frame local development practice (Guy and Hennebery, 2000). 
This brings us to the review of new institutional economics for better understanding of the 
urban development and redevelopment behaviors in the land market. 
 
2.4 Institutional Analysis: Property Rights and Institutions 
 
The importance of institutional analysis comes to the fore. Institutions are relatively stable 
sets of widely shared and generally realized expectations about how people will behave in 
particular social, economic, and political circumstances (Weimer, 1997). Two important 
notions are property rights and transaction cost. Property rights are relations among people 
concerning the use of things (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972), which are considered essential in 
the governance of the real estate market (Fischel, 1985; Webster and Lai, 2003). Zhu (2005) 
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holds that the ‘structure’ in the development process thesis is the institution of property rights, 
and elaborates on how socialist institution of people’s landownership has evolved into a new 
form to structure an emerging urban land market. 
 
During seven decades (1930-2000), study of new institutional economics obtained quiet great 
progress in the analysis of human behaviors, most of which are based on the criticism and 
amend of unpractical assumption of traditional economics. It mainly focuses on relationship 
among property rights, transaction costs, institutions and economic behaviors. While 
neo-classical economics assume human behaviors to be rational (Machina, 1987; Winter, 
1986), new institutional economics takes a more practical view towards the human behaviors: 
individual actors always confront with nonrepetitive choices where the information is 
incomplete and where outcomes are uncertain. 
 
Generally, property rights are explained as the bundle of rights to use and dispose of an 
economic resource and to derive utility (income) from it. According to the Roman law which 
specifies several categories of property rights, ownership rights consist of the right to use 
assets (usus), the right to capture benefits from assets (usus fructus), the right to change its 
form and substance (abusus), and the right to transfer all or some of the rights specified above 
to others at a price mutually agreed upon (Pejovich, 1990: 27-28). In one introduction of the 
economic significance of property rights, Pejovich (1997: 3) explains: “property rights are 
relations among individuals that arise from the existence of scarce goods and that pertain to 
their uses. … That is, property rights do not define the relationship between individuals and 
objects. Instead, they define the relationship among individuals with respect to all scarce 
goods.” 
 
The institutionalist approach provides a theory of social dynamics. Institutional constraints 
are the framework within which human interaction takes place. Property rights are structured 
by institutions. Voluntary exchange cannot flourish and develop into firms, markets and 
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governments without institutions to assign, arbitrate and protect private property rights 
(Webster& Lai, 2003). Rules and procedures evolved simplify the process of individuals to 
process, organize, and utilize information. The consequent institutional framework, by 
structuring human interaction, limits the choice set of the actors and reduce the uncertainties 
involved in human interaction (North, 1990). North (1990: 3-4) conceptualized institutions as 
“the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction…. In the jargon of the economist, institutions define and limit the set 
of choices of individuals”. Institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect 
on the costs of exchange and production. Institutions determine the cost of transacting and 
producing (transformation) and in the meantime, define and enforce property rights so as to 
induce potentially mutually beneficial resource uses and activity. It has been proved when 
transaction costs are significant, institutions matter (Coase, 1960; Alchian, 1977; Demsetz, 
1967; Barzel, 1997). “A set of political and economic institutions that provide low-cost 
transacting makes possible the efficient factor and product markets underlying economic 
growth” (North, 1992: 6). Similarly, a bad choice of institutional arrangements is likely to 
have different economic consequences. 
 
There are two types of game rules: formal ones and informal ones, while institutions also 
include the enforcement characteristics of both. In short, they consist of the structure that 
humans impose on their dealings with each other (North, 1992). Formal constraints are the 
rules that human beings devise such as constitutional, property-rights rules, and contracts. 
Informal ones include conventions and codes of behavior such as norms and customs. 
Informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more 
impervious to deliberate policies (Aoki, 2001), setting the way by which the mind processes 
information and informal constraints thus play an important role in the makeup of the choice 
both in the short-run and in the long-run evolution of societies (North, 1990). 
 
However, formal rules can complement and increase the effectiveness of informal constraints 
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by lower information, monitoring, and enforcement costs and hence make informal 
constraints possible solutions to more complex exchange. They can also be enacted to modify, 
revise, or replace informal constraints. The increasing complexity of societies would naturally 
raise the rate of return to the formalization of constraints and technological change tended to 
lower measurement costs. The creation of formal legal systems to handle more complex 
disputes entails formal rules; hierarchies that evolve with more complex organization entail 
formal structures to specify principal/ agent relationships (North, 1990). Formal rules include 
political rules, economic rules, and contracts. Problems of information—related to the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior of one of the agents—make it necessary to draw up 
contracts and define property rights (Hodgson, 1988). Political rules interact with economic 
rules which define economic policy and then specify a bundle of property rights over the use 
and rights to derive income from property within the contract that enable the exchange to 
occur in a human interaction. The efficiency of the political market is the key to the efficiency 
of property rights. If political transaction costs are low and the political actors have accurate 
models to guide them, then efficient property rights will emerge. But high transaction costs of 
political markets and subjective perceptions of the actors more often have resulted in property 
rights that do not induce economic growth, and the consequent organizations may have no 
incentive to create productive economic rules (North, 1990). 
 
2.5 Theories of Institutional Change 
 
The emergence of new property right systems is viewed as institutional change which is 
endogenously determined by the strategic interaction of political and economic actors. A 
number of theories of institutional change offer conceptual foundations for studying the 
transformation of property rights in post-communist countries, which can be grouped into 
three categories, namely economic, public choice, and distributional theories (Weimer, 1997). 
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The economic theory sees institutional change as resulting from the realization of 
opportunities for changes in rules that are Pareto improving (North and Thomas, 1973). 
Demsetz (1967) and Umbeck (1981) see new rights emerging through the decentralized 
cooperation of affected parties to find rules to internalize externalities that become significant 
because of scarcity resulting from changes in relative prices or technologies. Libecap (1989) 
extends the economic model by introducing a passive government that provides the 
framework for bargaining among affected parties. Economic theories generally ignore the role 
of politics and policies in institutional change. 
 
The public choice theory of institutional change introduces government as a strategic actor 
pursuing goals such as revenue maximization or electoral success through changes in formal 
rule (North and Thomas, 1973). In addition to the demand for the right occasioned by scarcity, 
they introduce a government actor who derives a benefit from granting the right. As the 
driving force in the public choice theory is government, it predicts that changes in property 
rights follow from changes in government interests. Subsequently, institutional change is a 
political process that changes formal institutions mostly by legislation. 
 
The distributional theory sees institutional change as the by-product of conflicts among 
interests seeking distributional gains (Knight, 1992; North, 1993). Bargaining among 
interested parties establishes rules that have distributional consequences. The rules reflect 
asymmetries in bargaining power among the participants. Allowing for the possibility of 
actors using the coercive powers of government, the conflict may result in formal rules that 
inflict losses on those with weaker bargaining positions. Institutional change can result from a 
change in either the interests or the resources of the actors. Actors negotiate for institutional 
changes, but outcomes are not inevitably efficient. Institutions may change spontaneously and 
they are a by-product of strategic interaction. 
 
The economic theory of institutional change predicts that the informal changes in property 
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rights that take place during informal privatization will be driven by efficiency considerations. 
According to this theory, the new forms of property rights emerging from informal 
privatization should be more efficient than the old ones that existed under the system of 
central planning. However, informal privatization appears economically inferior to other 
possible strategies, e.g. the TVE category, is not driven by efficiency considerations. As 
informal privatization cannot be considered a result of a coherent government policy, the 
public choice theory of institutional change is of less use for understanding this method of 
ownership transformation. On the other hand, the distributional theory distinguishes between 
past and future gainers from informal privatization and is consistent with the empirical 
findings. 
 




In the a few decades prior to the reform, the Chinese central government adopted several 
fiscal policies on the central-local and among local governments. At the beginning, the policy 
adopted is ‘two lines of revenue and expenditure’, that is, all the revenue is submitted to the 
central state treasury, and all the expenditure is planned and allocated by the central state 
budget. Following are ‘under the uniform leadership of the central government, management 
at various levels’ in 1951, ‘total amount management’ in 1957, ‘plan expenditure according to 
the revenue and fix it for five years’ in 1958, ‘divide the total revenue on a yearly base’ in 
1959, and ‘keep proportional revenue as profit at local levels’ in 1970 etc. All of these fiscal 
schemes reflect the idea of central control on fiscal resources. 
 
The fiscal system in the rural areas is no exception. All the revenue and expenditure of 
communes is planned in the county’s budget, even the fiscal system at the commune level 
- 16 - 
was abolished in 1962. After the experiment in the late 1970s, the policy of excessive profit 
retention over the quota of central government was adopted at the beginning of 1980s and 
taxation levy began in 1994. Most important feature of the new system is the local 
government can keep and depose the excessive profit. At the same time, fiscal system at 
township (town) level was established in 1985 when the commune system was abolished. It 
was stipulated that township/ town fiscal revenue is consist of budgetary funds, extra-budget 
funds and self-raised funds (Financial Ministry, Dec 1985). There was no clear definition on 
the self-raised funds except that it is expropriated by the township/ town government 
according to central government regulations. The kernel of revised fiscal contracts between 
the central and local governments is that the latter have become ‘residual claimants’ of fiscal 
revenue—a strong incentive for local governments to pursue local economic development 
(Zhu, 2005). 
 
Because budgetary and extra-budget funds are very limited and supervised by higher level of 
governments, self-raised funds increasingly became important parts of town/ township 
revenue. In 1986 the budgetary funds of national agricultural budget was 4.42 billion, and 
self-raised funds by town/ township governments was 2.73 billion. And in 1992, the 
budgetary funds was 8.96 billion and self-raised funds was as high as 14.18 billion (Sun, 
1999). The new fiscal system provided incentive to the town/ township governments to 
increase revenue, but there were no definition and regulations on the self-raised funds, nor 
democratic mechanism restricting government behavior.  
 
In the collective production period, due to their own benefit, the production brigade cadres 
would negotiate with higher level of government on the retention of products. The 
abolishment of commune system gave decision making rights on production to the peasants 
on the one hand, resulted in differentiation between interests of peasants and cadres. The 
incomes of cadres now rely on the fiscal revenue, either expropriated from peasants or other 
resources.  
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After taking over governance over the country, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
established government power deep into the countryside and succeed in building a top-down 
political system. Siu (1989) holds that the local cadres get power from the party and higher 
level of governments and act on the ideology and policy guidelines of the party. They are 
agents of the party and state, not representing the interest of villagers. But Oi (1989) thinks 
that local cadres are both the agents of the state, and also representatives of the local interests. 
Through clintelism, the local cadres can archive a balance between state, villagers and their 
own interests. In reality, with the devolution and decentralization of government power and 
fiscal system, the lower levels of government and cadres are more and more the main players 
confronting and conflicting with the peasants. Local state corporatism/ local corporatism is 
used to describe the behavior of local governments to promote local economic development to 
increase local revenue (Oi, 1992; Lin, 1995; Lewis, 1997).  
 
2.6.2 Rural Land Expropriation 
 
Land expropriation in China is known as a form of “government behaviour” (zhengfu xingwei) 
which is described as “using coercive measures to acquire private land under compensatory 
arrangement by the government in the public interest” (Shang, 1998). The “government 
behaviour” in land development prevails as a result of the current assignment of property 
rights. By law, the village collective has the right to use (jingying) and supervise (guanli) the 
use of land, but it has no right to transfer land for compensatory use. The state, on the other 
hand, “may, in accordance with the law, expropriate land which is under collective ownership, 
if it is in the public interest”(The PRC Land Administration Law (1988), Article 2; The PRC 
Land Administration Law (1999), Article 2). 
 
The requisition of rural land is the only type of transaction of land-ownership in China. The 
requisition of rural land by the state from the rural collectives is compulsory, but without a 
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market value-based compensation. Once the requisition of rural land occurs, the nature of 
land-ownership will be converted from rural collective-owned into state-owned land. 
However, while rural land is only permitted to be sold to the state, the actual land-user is not 
necessarily a state entity. Moreover, in most cases compensation is not directly paid by the 
state but by the land-user. The compensation seems to be in the form of a land price paid by 
the land-user for the rural land.  
 
The requisition of rural land is compulsory and rural land is only permitted to be sold to the 
state. And the standard of compensation for the requisition of rural land is legally defined in a 
standard formula. It can be deduced that, due to the state monopoly of buying and 
non-market-based compensation standards, the requisition of rural land is clearly not a pure 
market land transaction.  
 
In this assignment of property rights, land development proceeds in two steps: land 
expropriation (tudi zhengyong) by the government from villages, and land transaction (tudi 
churang) between the government and potential land users. Land expropriation is, in a sense, 
a procedure by which all rights formerly held by the village collective are relinquished to the 
local government. 
 
The “government behaviour” in land development is facilitated by joint forces in the county 
and sub-county administrations. According to the survey done by Guo (2001) in Yunnan 
Province, China, in land expropriation, applications were normally initiated by the township 
government, whereupon the county-city “Economy Technology Development Zone 
Commission” (ETDZC) which supervises and facilitated all land transaction procedures, and 
operates at both county and township levels. 
 
2.6.3 Local Cadre Management 
 
- 19 - 
The role of the village administration is particularly important in land expropriation. The 
implementation of the household responsibility system in the early reform period resulted in 
allocating greater economic power to the village-level administration. Following the 
dissolution of the basic accounting unit known as the production team, the village 
administration became the sole representative of collective ownership. This role was further 
strengthened by its institutional relationship with the township government. The relationship 
is anchored in a bureaucratic arrangement whereby the village leadership is appointed by the 
township government, a system widely practised in China.  
 
The village leadership usually consisted of a Party secretary, a village director and a 
book-keeper. In villages where administrative tasks were expected to be especially arduous, 
deputy directors were also appointed. The “law of avoidance” generally applied in that the 
Party secretary and the village director were preferably non-natives, but it was not without 
exceptions. The duration of each appointment term was three years, during which the village 
leaders were on the township government payroll. The appointment was renewable, 
depending on the performance of the village leaders and the requirements of the township 
government. In this system, there was mutual dependence between the township government 
and village leaders, the former on the latter for policy implementation and the latter on the 
former for official appointments. The CCP Organization Department established official 
guidelines for the annual evaluation (kaohe) of local Party and government leading cadres in 
1988, which contain very specific performance criteria, such as industrial output, output of 
township- and village-run enterprises, taxes and profits remitted. 
 
In this appointment practice, the relationship between village administration and township 
government appeared to be symbiotic. However, the symbiotic relation was not quite the 
same as that observed in business operations where networks formed as result of “rational 
responses” to the “institutions of an emerging market economy” (Wank, 1999). The 
participation of the village administration in this particular partnership was not necessarily 
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voluntary. In other words, the formation of the partnership was not based on a (rational) 
choice by the village administration; rather it was imposed by the particular institutional 
arrangement in which the village administration is subordinate to the township government. 
Nevertheless, the partnership can be quite rewarding for the village administration in gaining 
economic and political advantages by eliciting support from the township government. 
Therefore, even though it may not have been voluntary in the first place, the institutional 
relationship between village administration and township government often grew into a bond 
based on vested interests. 
 
In the villages where land was expropriated, the villagers were not consulted and deals were 
sealed between the township government and village leaders. The full co-operation of the 
village administration illustrated a controversial aspect of collective ownership wherein, to 
the villagers, the village collective held the power, but to the local state, it did not. While 
institutional vulnerability subjected the village administration to the power of the township 
government, the economic interests (distribution of income from land sales in addition to 
regular financial subsidies to the village administration from the township government) 
provided sufficient incentives for the village leaders to comply with the township government. 
This co-operation enabled the township government to exercise real control over the 
management of collective property,  
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CHAPTER THERE 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS ON RURAL LAND USE 
 
After reviewing the theoretical literature relevant to land development in Chapter Two, this 
chapter aims to depict the formal (written) institutions on rural land use, which provides basis 
for the discussion of informal practices by various players in following chapters. The 
evolution of the regulations is also included in the introduction, to better the understanding 
and historical issues pertaining to rural land use.  
 
3.1 Rights over land 
 
The Chinese Constitution stipulates that ‘‘[L]and in urban areas is owned by the State. Land 
in rural and suburban areas, except for that stipulated by laws as being owned by the state, is 
collectively owned by rural residents’’ (China 1998, Article 8; China 2004, Article 10). All 
rural land is classified according to its use into ‘‘agricultural land’’, ‘‘construction land’’ (land 
used for nonagricultural purposes), and ‘‘unused land’’ (land other than agricultural land and 
construction land) (China 1998, Article 4). 
 
During the early years of the new socialist country, rural land in the villages was gradually 
collectivitized, private ownership over which is stripped. The rural land system based on the 
collective ownership was eventually legitimized in 1962 (CCCCP 1962). Rural land within 
the boundary of a Production Team was owned and operated by the Production Team. Such 
rural land was not allowed for lease or sale, however; no individual or organization could 
occupy the rural land without the approval of the government at the county level or above 
(CCCCP 1962). 
 
A collective could possess, use, and benefit from the ownership of land, but it did not have the 
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right to transfer the land. The peasants, as collective owners of the rural land, actually enjoyed 
only two clear rights: (1) to use and benefit from the very small amount of land distributed to 
them as private plots and housing sites, and (2) to labor on the collectively owned agricultural 
land. This rural land system established in 1962 was then carried on until the introduction of 
the household production responsibility system (HRS) in 1978 when the use rights of 
agricultural land were contracted by the collectives to individual farm households. The 
ownership of rural land remained collective even after the dismantling of the rural commune 
system in 1983. 
 
An institutional framework is established for rural land use, conversion, and circulation in the 
central planning period. Land was taken away from the private sector and transformed into 
collectively owned assets. As a means of socialist production (rather than a commodity), land 
was not allowed for market transaction, its use was free of charge, and its disposition or 
allocation was handled administratively by the state. Low efficiency in land use and the lack 
of individual production enthusiasm arise as a serious problem.   
 
3.2 Conversion from Agricultural to Construction Land 
 
According to laws and regulations, the nature of land rights can be divided into: the collective 
ownership to land, the use right to state-owned land, the use right to collectively owned land, 
and other real rights. Note that state ownership is not listed separately as a right, while the 
collective ownership is. Such definition makes it clear that the collective land can be acquired 
and conversed to state-owned land whenever deemed necessary. 
 
The current format of collective ownership is the direct heritage of collectivization and the 
commune system. The former people’s commune consisted of three echelons: the commune, 
the production brigade and the production team. In response to the disastrous results of the 
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Great Leap Forward1, the ownership of the means of production – agricultural fields, farm 
animals, implements and so forth – was refashioned in a “three-level ownership.” Between 
1959 and 1962, the central leadership wavered between the production brigade and the team 
as the basic holder of land ownership and accounting for purposes of organizing labor and 
distributing income. For reasons of economic efficiency, the Eighth National Party Congress 
in September 1962 finally adopted the revised draft of the Work Regulations for the Rural 
People’s Communes (popularly known as the 60 Articles). In the revised draft, the production 
team was identified as the primary accounting unit and the owner of land. 
 
In the early 1980s, the communes were dismantled and the Household Contract 
Responsibility System2 was implemented. Generally, as illustrated in the figure below, the 
township/town (xiang/zhen) replaced the commune, the administrative village (xingzhengcun) 
replaced the brigade, and the natural village (zirancun) or the villagers’ group (cunmin xiaozu) 
replaced the team.  
 
Figure 3.1: The administration evolution of rural area after the reform  
 
 
In the central plan period, collectively owned agricultural land was worked collectively 
                                                        
1 The Great Leap Forward of the PRC was an economic and social plan to use China’s vast population to rapidly 
transform mainland China from a primarily agrarian economy dominated by peasant farmers into a modern, 
industrialized communist society. The Leap was initiated and led by Mao, and carried out by the CCP from 1958 to 
early 1962. 
2Under the household responsibility system, land is contracted to individual households for a period of fifteen 
years. After fulfilling the procurement quota obligations, farmers are entitled to sell their surplus on the market or 
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except for a small portion that rural collectives distributed to their members for use as private 
plots. Rural collectives also distributed existing construction land among their members and 
collectively owned entities for the purposes of public welfare undertakings (e.g., clinics, 
schools, sports, and cultural centers), Commune and Brigades Enterprises (CBEs), and 
housing. Rural collectives made most of the land-allocation decisions at the brigade or 
production team level, but the conversion of agricultural land to construction land was usually 
handled by the commune or county government. 
 
The Household Production Responsibility System (HRS) was established in 1987, giving the 
peasants the decision-making power on plantation. The commune system that had existed in 
rural China from 1958 to 1983 was dismantled and replaced by a township and village system 
in which peasants are allowed to engage in a variety of nonagricultural activities on the basis 
of their local comparative advantages and personal expertise. Rural industrialization was 
promoted to improve the economic development in rural areas. This change created a great 
demand for nonagricultural construction land.  
 
Institutional changes concerning land management started with the promulgation of the Land 
Management Law in 1987. The law established the State Land Administration Bureau (Guojia 
tudi guanli ju) to be in charge of comprehensive land management, including the formulation 
of land management policies. The law also spells out how land use conversion and transaction 
in urban and rural areas should be handled to reflect China’s new political and economic 
situation.  
 
Under the HRS, the contracted agricultural land may be further subcontracted or circulated in 
the secondary market within the rural collective sector for agricultural production (China 
1998, Articles 2 and 15). To protect agricultural land and maintain food security, however, the 
state does not allow farm households to convert the contracted agricultural land for 
nonagricultural uses although the reality differs significantly from the state’s intentions. 
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The rural collective—the villagers’ committee (cunminweiyuanhui), the village economic 
cooperative (cunjingji hezuoshe), or the township collective economic entity (xiang jiti jingji 
zuzhi)—has the authority to allocate existing rural construction land within the rural collective 
sector for use as public welfare undertaking, township and village enterprises (TVEs), and 
housing sites for its members. These rural enterprises may also use their buildings and land 
use rights as collateral to obtain a bank loan.  
 
The state also imposed considerable constraints over rural collectives concerning the 
allocation and use of construction land. When allocating quota of agricultural land to be 
converted to construction land to rural users, the village collectives must comply with the 
township “overall land utilization plan (tudi liyong zongti guihua)” and the “annual land 
utilization plan (tudi liyong niandu jihua)” (China 1998, Articles 59 and 60). Each farm 
household is allowed to possess only one residential plot (yihu yizhai), and housing 
construction must comply with the official size standards, which vary from province to 
province (China 1998, Article 62). Moreover, the decisions of rural collectives to use and 
allocate construction land are subject to approval by the Land Bureau at the county level or 
above (China 1998, Article 61). Most importantly, agricultural land is not allowed for market 
transaction to nonagricultural or commercial users without state expropriation and approval 
(China 1998, Articles 43 and 63). The state also required peasants and individual enterprises 
needing land for construction to submit a land use application to the village committee or the 
township economic entity for examination and to the county government for approval (Lin 
and Ho, 2003). 
 
3.3 Conversion from Rural to State Land  
 
3.3.1 Central state regulation on rural-urban land conversion 
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Under China’s Constitution, the state has the right to expropriate collectively owned land if it 
is in the public interest, and state expropriation was the only way to shift land from the rural 
collective sector to the urban state sector (China 1954, Article 13). In other words, for a state 
unit to gain access to the use of a piece of collectively owned land, the local government, 
acting on behalf of the state, would first expropriate the land and then allocate it to the state 
unit. In such cases, the state unit paid the collective a compensation for the land, and the state 
made arrangements for the resettlement of the displaced peasants. 
 
The tool used by the central state to regulate land conversion from agriculture to 
nonagricultural sectors in the 1980s was a quota allocation system in which the amount of 
land allowed for conversion out of the agricultural stock was initially set by the central state 
and then distributed downward to provinces, prefectures, municipalities, counties, and 
townships. While the national annual land-utilization plan set the overall limits, actual control 
was left to a hierarchical administrative system consisting of state agencies at various 
administrative levels to review requests for conversion. 
 
Before 1982, decisions to use agricultural land for non-agricultural use were made at the 
commune (now township) level. From 1982 to 1986, the power to approve conversion of 
agricultural land to nonagricultural use was shifted to the Agricultural Bureau at the county 
level. In 1986 the State Council established the State Land Administration Bureau (SLAB) 
and promulgated the Land Management Law, China’s basic law concerning land 
administration. The main responsibility of the SLAB is to formulate national policies and 
regulations on land conservation, development, and use (Yeh and Wu, 1996).Subsequently, 
land Administration Bureaus have been established at various levels of governments.  
 
State construction projects using up to 3 mu (1 mu equals 0.0667 hectares) of farmland (or up 
to 10 mu of nonagricultural land) required approval of the Land Administration Bureau at the 
county level; those using between 3 mu and 10 mu of farmland (or between 10 mu and 20 mu 
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of nonagricultural land) required approval at the prefecture (diji shi) level; and those using 
between 10 mu and 1,000 mu of farmland (or between 20 mu and 2,000 mu of nonagricultural 
land) required approval at the provincial level. State construction projects that used more than 
1,000 mu of farmland (or 2,000 mu of nonagricultural land) would have to be approved by the 
State Council. 
 
The use of annual quotas and the hierarchical review and approval system introduced by the 
central state had unfortunately turned out to be a failure. In many municipalities and counties, 
the profits generated through taking the land out of the agricultural stock cheaply for 
high-value urban and commercial development quickly became a major source of local 
revenue, accounting for 30 percent of municipal revenue to 70 percent (Lin and Ho, 2004). 
Thus state agencies at various administrative levels from the province down to township all 
had vested interests in land expropriation and conveyance, and local governments could not 
be relied upon to enforce the rules set by the central state. On the contrary, the rules and 
regulations introduced by the central state were effectively contested and manipulated by 
local governments in various ways. For instance, the authorization limits for land conversion 
specified in the 1986 Land Management Law for local governments had been easily exceeded 
through dividing a mega project into smaller ones. The local strategy is known as “cutting the 
whole into small pieces (huazheng weiling)”. But there are quota controls? Another local 
strategy was to find a way around the limitation of the annual quota by playing with the 
classification of land. Because local cadres as land use planners and regulators also had vested 
interests in land expropriation and conveyance, they could quietly misclassify the needed 
agricultural land as already “nonagricultural land” and therefore not subject to the limitation 
of the annual land-conversion quota (Lin and Ho, 2004).  
 
The failure of the hierarchical review and approval system to control land conversion forced 
the central state to consider alternative ways to protect China’s shrinking agricultural land. 
The compromise made by the central state was to set a bottom-line or minimum amount of 
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land that was considered absolutely necessary for agricultural production. Through a 
mechanism known as “dynamic equilibrium (dongtai pingheng)”, the minimum is maintained 
by replacing the occupied agricultural land with newly claimed farmland. This mechanism 
gave local governments considerable freedom in farmland conversion. In November 1991, the 
central state called for the establishment of “protected basic farmland regions (jiben nongtian 
baohuqu)”. This decree was followed by the promulgation of the “Regulations for the 
Protection of Basic Farmland” in August 1994 that prohibited the removal of “basic 
farmland” from cultivation. Finally, in 1998, the central state substantially revised its Land 
Management Law by changing the rules for farmland protection. Specifically, the new law 
requires each province to designate at least 80 percent of its cultivated land as ‘‘basic 
farmland,’’ which must be preserved (China 1998, Article 34). 
Nevertheless, the revised Land Management Law requires provincial governments to “adopt 
measures to ensure that the total amount of cultivated land within its administration region is 
not reduced,” and, if reduced, to take responsibility for the reclamation of an equal amount of 
land within its administration region or in a different location (China 1998, Article 33). The 
central state also abandoned the previous hierarchical review and approval system and 
replaced it with a new one in which the power was significantly reshuffled or rescaled upward 
to the provincial level. All expropriation of agricultural land and most conversions of land 
from agricultural use for urban development now require state approval at the provincial level 
or higher. Specifically, the expropriation of any basic farmland, cultivated land other than 
basic farmland in excess of thirty-five hectares, and other land of lower quality in excess of 
seventy hectares requires the approval of the State Council (China 1998, Article 45). The 
expropriation of land in all other cases requires government approval at the provincial level 
and must be reported to the State Council. 
 
Figure 3.2 State policies on agricultural-construction land conversion in different periods 
1982-1986 Agricultural Bureau at county level 
1986-1991 Hierarchical review and approval system at various administrative levels 
1991onwards Dynamic equilibrium to maintain minimum amount of agricultural land  
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Establishment of “protected basic farmland regions” 
1994 Prohibition of the removal of “basic farmland” from cultivation 
1998onwards Each province to designate at least 80% of its cultivated land as “basic 
farmland” (China 1998, Article 34) 
All expropriation of agricultural land and most conversions of land from 
agricultural use for urban development requires state approval at the 
provincial level or higher (China 1998, Article 45) 
Source: State policies  
 
In line with the state policy on rural-state land conversion evolving from hierarchal 
government approval to the dynamic equilibrium approach, ever since 1999 there were new 
institutions in the rural-state land conversion, besides the rural land conversion quota. First is 
the construction land application. The application material includes one note and four 
schemes, that is, the project note, agricultural land conversion scheme, agricultural land 
reclamation scheme, land appropriation scheme and land transfer scheme. Second is the New 
Added Construction Land Usage Fee (Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Land and Resource, 
Decree117, 1999). It is collected by the State Council or provincial governments when 
approving rural-state land conversion and land expropriation, and is paid by the county/ city 
level government from the land transfer premium received. 30% of the fee should be 
submitted to the State and 70% goes to the provincial government. The fee is supposed to be 
used in agricultural land consolation. The third is the arable land reclamation fee payable to 
the District Land Resource Consolation Office. And the last is the adjustment of Overall Land 
Utilization Plan, since that plan of Beijing was accomplished in 1998.  
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Figure 3.3 New regulations on rural-urban land conversion from 1999 
 
Source: Beijing Municipal Land Bureau 
 
3.3.2 Institutions for Rural-Urban Land Conversion Approval 
 
The occupation of agricultural land by urban development became a serious problem in China 
along with the rapid economic development. Paid transfer of urban land use right and the real 
estate market have been established since 1987. In Yeh and Wu (1996), there were three types 
of transactions related to the rural land in the land market of China after the land reform, 
namely, acquisition of rural land by work units for project-specific development, acquisition 
by the municipal government for comprehensive development and land leasing respectively. 
A work unit applies for a land acquisition permit from the municipality and pays a standard 
compensation fee to the farmers. In the comprehensive development, the municipal 
government acquires land directly from farmers, develop it comprehensively, and then 
allocate it to users, which are mostly work units. Otherwise, rural land is acquired by the 
municipal government and then leased to other users through the market mechanism of 
negotiation, tender and auction. The last type of land transaction is the most recent and 
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its “bottom-up” character. It starts with a prospective land user initiating a development 
proposal (Wong and Zhao 1999). As illustrated in the following figures, the proposal will 
have to follow formal procedures by applying for a project permit, a planning permit, and 
finally and Land Use Right permit from the respective government bodies. And all the permits 
are subject to final confirmation by the city mayor or deputy mayor.  
 
Figure 3.4: Formal process of land apportionment in China  
 
Source: Wong and Zhao, 1999 
 
The formal approval process of a development project goes as: 
Figure 3.5 Formal approval process of a development project initiated by private developers 
Activities by developer Administrator 
Identify development project and sign letter of 
intent or cooperation agreement 
Private developers and cooperation party 
Submit “Project Proposal” Approval from Planning Committee 
Apply for “Project Location Note” Issued by Planning Bureau 
Apply for “Construction Land Planning 
Permit” 
Issued by Planning Bureau 
Apply for State Land, sign “Land Expropriation Agreement” with the original users and 
“State Land Usufruct Transfer Contract”, submit 40% of land premium 
“Temporary State Land Usufruct Certificate” Land Bureau 
Construction Land Use Permit Land Bureau 
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Apply for “Construction Project Planning 
Permit” 
Issued by Planning Bureau 
“Construction Project Start Permit” Issued by Construction Committee 
Source: Municipal Land Bureau of Beijing, 2003 
 
As illustrated in the figure 3.6 below, violation of the formal or legal regulations and 
procedures constitute black land markets on the rural land. While the black market I is the 
unauthorized use of agricultural land for rural construction, this research mainly concerns 
with the black market III, that is, the informal conversion of rural agricultural land to 
commercial use land. 
 















Source: Lin and Ho, 2003                                         
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3.4 Institutional Setting and Situation in Beijing 
 
3.4.1 Rural Construction Land Use 
 
The state also required peasants and individual enterprises needing land for construction to 
submit a land use application to the village committee or the township economic entity for 
examination and to the county government for approval. The rural construction land applier 
(applicant) should first acquire the Construction Land Plan Permit complying with approved 
town/ township master plan. The TVE, public facilities and welfare undertaking projects 
should first apply to the district/ county land bureau, which pass the application on to 
government of the same level or to the municipal government according to the authorization 
limitation. Collective construction projects using up to 2 mu of farmland (or up to 10 mu of 
nonagricultural land) require approval of the Land Administration Bureau at the district/ 
county level; projects exceeding these amount require approval of the municipal government. 
There are also ceilings for peasant housing land. In the inner suburban areas and populated 
outer suburban areas, each household uses no more than 0.25 mu and households in other 
regions use no more than 0.3 mu. 
 
3.4.2 Rural-state land conversion 
 
The land use organizations have to apply to the municipal/ district/ county land bureau, which 
has the eligible land conversion approval authorization, for construction land with annual land 
construction plan and ‘construction land planning permit’ issued by the city planning authority. 
In terms of the approval authority, any development projects covering over 1000 mu arable 
land or 2000 mu other rural land have to be approved by the State Council; projects less than 
1000 mu arable land or 2000 mu other rural land can be approved by the municipal 
government. The district/ county level government can only approval agricultural land 
conversion of less than 10 mu. 
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The land use organizations should pay the land compensation fee and labor allocation subsidy 
to the villagers who originally live on the land. The compensation fee for agricultural land is 
stipulated to be 6 times of the average productivity in the past 3 years. And the labor 
allocation subsidy per mu is no more than 10 times of the average of annual output of the 
fields. The surplus peasant labors from the land expropriated should be absorbed by 
developing non-agricultural jobs or town-village enterprises. The disposal of the total 
compensation should be decided jointly by the district/county government and town/ 
township government/ village collectives. The joint enterprises co-invested by state- owned or 
urban collectively owned enterprises and rural collective economic organizations can 
expropriate rural land. The rural collective economic organizations can also use collective 
land use right as share. 
 
In 1999  the Changping County was transformed to Changping District, which gave the 
municipal government more control power. Further in 2002 there was a power reshuffle in the 
planning management. Before this the county/ district planning bureau was under the 
government at the same level; but afterward they are vertically controlled within the sector by 
the municipal planning bureau. As far as land development control is concerned, the project 
location note is issued by the municipal bureau now, instead of the county/ district counterpart. 
The planning land use permit and construction project permit are in the jurisdiction of county/ 
district planning bureau (author’s interview, 2005). Thus, the municipal government deprived 
the land conversion decision making power from the county/ district government.  
 
In the 1990s the rural land conversion to state land and agricultural land to rural construction 
land are both controlled by overall land utilization plan and annual land utilization plan, and 
more importantly, the hieratical approval of local governments. Those projects without any 
government approvals or approvals by governments beyond their approval authorization 
limitation are deemed as illegal development projects. Or we can call it informal 
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developments. Here come the critical points – how are informal developments carried out; 
why there are such markets (i.e. demand for and supply of illegal projects); and the most 
important, what hidden rules (institutions) are. 
 
3.4.3 Land Conversion Situation in Beijing in the 1990s 
 
The figure below shows the annual expropriated or converted rural land which was approved 
by the municipal government. In May 1997 the State Council and the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCCCP) announced a one-year moratorium on arable land 
conversion; this moratorium was subsequently extended to 1999. Due to this “shock therapy” 
in rural land sector, the land conversion dropped dramatically after 1997 after it reached its 
first peak the 1993 and 1994, but increased with the same, if not larger, momentum after the 
cease of national moratorium policy. The majority of land converted was arable land during 
the 1990s, while the rural residential land redevelopment boomed only after 2000. 
 
Figure 3.7: Rural land expropriation approved by municipal government in the 1990s 




















Source: Beijing Municipal Land Bureau, 2003  
 
However, besides to the officially approved rural land conversion, illegal land use activities 
are pervasive in Beijing. Because of the national moratorium of arable land, Beijing launched 
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a land use survey in 1997 to regulate the land market. According to the survey results, from 
1991 to 1996 there had been 47,900 cases of newly added construction land in rural areas, 
which totally amounted to 561,000 mu. Among the newly converted land area, 16,000 cases 
(33.4%) are illegal, covering 183,000 mu (33.3%) (Beijing Municipal Land Bureau, 2003).  
 
Even after the regulation in 1997, in the one year from Oct 1998 to Oct 1999, in the inner 
peri-urban area of Beijing, which consists of Districts of Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai, 
Shijingshan, Changping, Daxing, there had been 221 cases of newly added construction land 
(23,000 mu). 43% of them (95) belonged to illegal land use, covering 6,455 mu (28%) (State 
Ministry of Land and Resource, 2000). 
 
From Oct 1999 to Oct 2000, 501 cases of newly added construction land (30,000 mu) 
occurred in the inner and outer peri-urban area, and illegally used land took a share of 46.51% 
in terms of cases and 30.67% in terms of land area. 45.3% of the total converted land area and 
43.38% of the illegal land use area are arable land (Municipal Land Bureau, 2004). 
 
It can be concluded that illegal activities took almost the same share as the approved land 
conversion, even after municipal government took measures aiming to control such 
phenomenon. Illegal land occupation and use aroused social discontentment. Although the 
village and town level government tried hard to prevent the villagers to appeal to municipal 
level government, there were still 422 appeals (38,000 mu and 77% is on arable land) and 209 
appeals (49,100 mu and 92% is on arable land) occurred respectively in 2000 and 2001 (Jan to 
Oct). Generally villagers appeal for the land sale to developers by the cadres without their 
consent. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EMPIRICAL STUDY ON LAND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Based on the institutional background described in Chapter Three, this chapter touches down 
on the case study area. Firstly the expansion of Beijing urban area and social-economic 
profile of Beiqijia Town is given. The land use details are broken down to industrial, 
residential and other rural use, and the commercial projects are further investigated in terms 
of land conversion approval, acquisition agreement and other related issues. Largely 
documenting the land conversion on project-basis, this chapter is for further summary of 
various forms of land use legality and property rights arrangement.  
 
4.1 The development of Municipality Beijing 
 
The Municipality of Beijing consists of 16 districts and 2 
counties. According to the extent of geographical distance 
and economic dependency, the Extended Urban Area of 
Beijing is usually seen as compounding 14 inner districts 
(Sun, 1992; Zong, 2002a, 2002b; Feng, 2003). As the 
figure illustrated, the extended urban area is further divided into urban core (city proper), 
inner peri-urban area (Shijingshan, Haidian, Chaoyang, Fengtai districts) and outer peri-urban 
area (Daxing, Changping, Mentougou, Fangshan, Shunyi, Tongzhou counties and districts).  
 
4.1.1 Land Coverage Change 
 
At the beginning of the new socialist country, the old capital city was a highly compact core 
surrounded by a few constellations mainly located in the south to northwest not far from the 
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central core. The old city proper already formed at that time is usually referred as the urban 
core area. The period 1951-1959 had seen large-scale heavy industry projects development, 
including textile manufacturing in the east suburb, electronics in the northeast, machinery and 
chemical plants in the southeast and metallurgy and heavy machinery in the west. This 
project-specific development resulted in self-sufficient work units and non-continuous land 
use, though not very far from the central core area. Improvement of transportation conditions 
connecting them to the central core largely extended the spatial structure. As time went on to 
the early 1980s, because the economic stagnancy there had not been much changes in terms 
of the size of land coverage, but more infill of blank land between existing land use. 
 
Figure 4.1 Land Coverage change in Beijing from 1950-2000 
   Note: From above to bottom on the left: 
      1: Built-up area of Beijing in 1951             From above to bottom on the right: 
      2: Built-up area of Beijing in 1959              4: Built-up area of Beijing in 1991 
      3: Built-up area of Beijing in 1983              5: Built-up area of Beijing in 2000 
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Source: China Academy of Urban Planning & Design, 2003 
 
Accompanied by radial and ring roads construction, the built up area remarkably enlarged. 
Reforms brought about rapid spatial growth in the 1980s, which is typical “corridor effect”. 
Fostered by outward transportation corridors completion, continuous expansion and leap-frog 
developments boomed. The main components of land use coverage at 1991 could be 
categorized as central core, growth corridors and sub-centers along the corridors. However, in 
ten-year vibrant economic and city uplifting in the 1990s, spatial growth was characterized by 
infill development between existing land use, with the city core keeping continuously 
expanding outward. The sub-centers in outer areas moderately grew over time, but to a far 
less extent compared with the city core. 
 
4.1.2 Demographic Redistribution  
 
Accompanying rapid growth of total population in Beijing, it experienced geographical 
concentration in the inner peri-urban area. According to the National Census Data in 1990 and 
2000, population increase in the inner peri-urban area accounts for majority (87%) of that of 
the whole municipality. And the growth rate is as high as 60.15% compared with -9.5% and 
12.73% for urban core and outer peri-urban area respectively. Population distribution across 
urban core, inner peri-urban area and outer peri-urban area was 4:3:2 in 1982, 4:4:2 in 1990 
and 5:6:2 in 2000 eventually (Feng, 2003). The figures 4.2 and 4.3 below show the population 
growth rate, indicating that the inner peri-urban area is the most dynamic area in terms of 
population growth.  
 
Such geographical concentration in inner peri-urban area is also true for the temporary 
population (migration/ floating population), which is of special economic meaning to Chinese 
cities (Webster, 2000). The economic reform and city boom had seen an influx of rural 
population into cities. In 1982 there were 170,000 floating people in Beijing and 600,000 in 
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1990. The number soared to 2.57 million in 2000. The migrants were almost evenly 
distributed across the urban core, inner peri-urban and outer peri-urban areas in 1982. 
However, the proportion became 1:3:2 in 1990 and 1: 5: 2 in 2000 (Feng, 2003). 
  
Figure 4.2 Population growth rates of different areas of Beijing from 1950-2000 
 
 
 1982-1990 1990-2000 
Regions Absolute growth Annual  growth rate (%) Absolute growth 
Annual  
growth rate (%)
Inner City -81637 -0.43 -221,958 -0.99 
Inner Peri-urban 1,149, 145 4.34 2,399, 621 4.82 
Outer Peri-urban 521,236 1.55 572,124 1.21 
Municipality 1,588, 744 2 2,749, 787 2.29 
Source: Feng, 2003 
 
From the figure 4.2 above, it is clear that the areas experiencing most rapid population growth 
is in the inner peri-urban area, while our study area, Beiqijia Town, is in the top tier in the 
north.  
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Figure 4.3: Geographical Location of Beiqijia Town 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Beiqijia Location in Changping County  Figure 4.5: 21 villages in Beiqijia Town 
 
The targeted research area, Beiqijia Town is located along north part of the central axis of 
Beijing and the frontier between Changping District and the city area, consisting of 21 
villages. It is one of the most dynamic areas in the 1990s both in terms of both population 
growth and land conversion. The demographic growth rate was more than 100% over the 
1990s compared less than 20% in the 1980s. While there was nearly no land conversion from 
rural to urban use in the 1980s (Liu, 1997), rapid and extensive development characterized the 
1990s. Although it is residential development led peri-urbanization of Beijing’s own 
characteristic (Webster, 2002), economic and social aspects such as patchy and 
migration-oriented development justify its representativeness as peri-urbanization research. 
 
4.2.1 Economic Growth of Beiqijia Town 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Beijing GDP growth rate Beiqijia GDP growth rate
 
Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
 
The GDP of Beiqijia Town began to soar from the early 1990s and its overall growth rate 
outperformed that of Beijing during the 1990s, although there was severe up and downs 
around the middle.  
 
Figure 4.7: GDP structure of Beiqijia Town, 1990-2001 







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Primary Secondary Tertiary
 
Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
 
Its structure indicates that the up and down in the GDP around the middle 1990s. The sudden 
growth of secondary in 1994 brought the GDP growth rate to more than 50%. However, the 
following year saw a sudden drop in 1995 caused another but minus over 50% growth rate. 
And the tertiary sector developed very fast and worked as the growth engine. The tertiary 
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sector took a share over of 50% of GDP ever since 1997. Such phenomenon was led by the 
real estate industry, contributing to the tertiary sector and construction-related secondary 
sector development.  
 

















Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
 
In 2002 the tax revenue for Beiqijia Town is about 12.851 million，among which 60 million 
or 47% comes from cooperate tax of Shuntiantong Cop., the real estate development company 
of the municipal affordable housing project Tiantong Garden. And property tax is around 
24.41million, taking a share of 19%. The tax revenue in 2000 was 36.93 million and grew 
51% in the following year. In 1997 Beiqijia Town was ranked the second of economic 
advanced towns in Beijing Municipality and designated as one of experimental reform towns 
by the State System Reform Committee (Beiqijia Town government, 2005).  
 
4.2.2 Demographic Characteristics of Beiqijia Town 
 
The population mainly consists of relocated people from inner city of Beijing and floating 
population from other provinces, taking up 55.14% and 33.70% respectively, while the local 
residents only are 11.16% (Beiqijia Town government, 2003). The population relocation is 
induced by the large-scale commercial housing development. East Zone of Tiantong Garden, 
a large-scale government “Affordable Housing” project, is in the jurisdiction of Beiqijia 
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Town. It accounts for part of relocated population, as illustrated in the following table. Due to 
the difficulty of survey, actual number is larger than that in the table below.  
 
Table 4.1         The population constitution in Beiqijia Town 
Note: Data in brackets are statistical number excluding that of Tiantong Garden 
Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
 
 
From 1997 to 2002, the total population had been increasing at 38 percent annually. Both the 
growth rates of the reallocating people from other parts of Beijing and floating population 
from other provinces are as high as 51 percent, while that of the local registered population is 
only 7.7 percent. Especially in 2003, due to the Olympic Games construction, reallocating 
population from other parts of Beijing increased 46, 8000, and floating population from other 
provinces accrued by 35, 5000 because of commercial housing construction in the 
neighborhood.  
 
4.2.3 Land Use Situation in Beiqijia Town 
 
The total land area of Beiqijia Town is 60.45 km2, and the used construction land area is 23.52 
km2. The break-down of utilized land area is as the following table. The land used by the state, 
which takes up 12.9% of the total construction land, is mainly land administrated or occupied 
by state/ municipal work units or their subsidiary units such as the Officer Training School of 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Chinese Medicine Factory of Tongrentang. This kind of land 









Population 232550 (170550) 25951 
17778 8173 128235 (66235) 78364 
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was primarily expropriated by urban work units in the 1980s, but the practice has 
discontinued since then. Affordable housing is the municipal subsidized housing project 
entitled “Tiantong Garden” targeted at low-income urban residents. The project converted two 
villages in Beiqijia Town to urban land uses. Commercial housing land (23.1% of the total 
construction land area) refers to residential units developed by professional development 
companies for sale in the market for profit. There are 30 middle-high end residential 
communities, total floor areas amounting 2.6 million square meters. And the housing stock 
evenly consists of two types of villa and apartment (Beiqijia Town government, 2003).  
 
Other types of construction land take the largest share in the construction land category. They 
include peasants housing land and land managed by the town government, such as industrial 
land in the development zones. The peasant housing land takes up 5.81 sq. km (24.7% of the 
construction land). In terms of land use type, residential land use accounts for around 60% of 
the construction land area.  
 
Table 4.2: Land Use in Beiqijia Town in 2003 
Source: China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 2003 
 
Table 4.3: Categorization according to the land use types in 2003 
 Land Area (sq. 
km.) 
Percentage (%) of Construction 
Land 
Total 60.45  - 
Construction Land 23.52  100 
Urban Work Units Used 
Land 
3.03 12.9% 
Category Area (10,000 M2) Share of construction land (%) 
Residential 1444.03 61.43 
Public facilities 202.50 8.61 
Industrial 341.56 14.53 
Storage 75.74 3.22 
Transportation 135.20 5.75 
Road & square  84.57 3.60 
Municipal public facilities 7.18 0.31 
Special use (Military) 60.02 2.55 
Construction land  2352.00 100.00 
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Affordable Housing 2.66 11.3% 
Commercial Housing 5.44  23.1% 
Industrial Land 3.42 14.5% 
Rural Residential Land 5.81 24.7% 
Other Construction Land 1.23 5.3% 
Expressway & Road Land 1.93 8.2% 
Non-construction Land 36.93 - 
Source: China Academy of Urban Planning & Design, 2003 
 
Figure 4.9 Land use map in Beiqijia Town in 2003 
 
Source: China Academy of Urban Planning & Design, 2003 
 
As indicated here, a large share of more than 60% of the construction land is contributable to 
the residential sector. The second largest is the industrial land use 14.5%. Putting two together, 
it accounts for 75%. Thus it is reasonable to focus on the two groups of land use. To conduct 
preliminary investigation, the main land development types can be roughly broken down into 
the following 4 groups, which will be scrutinized respectively. 
z Industrial land (14.5%) 
z Rural village housing (24.7%) 
z Affordable housing (11.3%) 
z Commercial housing (23.1%) 
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It is shown that Beiqijia Town is of characteristics as inner peri-urban town of Beijing, that is, 
residential-led development. Yet, more common issues such as piecemeal development, 
floating population, social transformation and environment degradation justify its 
peri-urbanization research meaning. In the rapid transformation from rural to peri- urban area, 
what actors are involved and how the property rights on land is displayed during the 
interaction between these actors that would foster the physical output and any social inequity? 
Are problems like industrial zone fever and black land market obvious here? To carry out 
such a research in the chaotic and rapid developing area, the author would like to trace the 
development process of property on the land and explore the actors involved and property 
rights arrangement. 
 
4.3 Land Development in Beiqijia Town 
 
Development process approach is taken in this research, which basically involves the land 
acquisition, planning permission and marketing etc. Land use and development condition data 
is organized on project basis. The main data sources are the municipal authority’s archival 
records, interviews with local cadres as well as officials in land and planning administration 
and direct observation in the field trip. Based on the census of commercial residential and 
industrial projects currently in Beiqijia Town, the author tries to find out the land acquisition 
data behind them, as expropriation is required if rural land is to be put into commercial uses 
and expropriation is supposedly to be recorded by the municipal land bureau. Nationwide 
cadastre survey was carried out in the in 1997, and all the informal development was detected 
and recorded. As will be revealed later, most of development projects are informal in the 
sense that they lacked permit for rural land expropriation issued by the municipal authority. 
Thus the land expropriation records, including legal and illegal cases, are the primary data 
source of this research. The fieldtrip and interviews further deepen the author’s understanding 
of the land development in the area.  
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In China, government archives and interviews are more important and reliable than statistical 
data, though not easily accessible. Records of rural land expropriation issued by the 
Municipal Land Bureau are scrutinized. Author’s fieldtrip and interviews with local town and 
village cadres effectively caught up the knowledge gap of the rural construction land 
development, but no quantitative data is handy. 
 
Due to the data limitation, this research mainly focuses on the land acquisition session in the 
whole development process. From the land use situation data, it is clear that the residential 
and industrial land uses take lion’s share of as much as 76% among the total construction land, 
while the other land uses are supporting facilities for either residential or industrial land use. 
Thus the analysis focuses on the residential and industrial land. 
 
4.3.1 Industrial Land Use 
 
Industrial land is developed either by the urban work units in the 1980s or by the local. For 
the former, most of industrial land developed by the urban work units is warehouse buildings; 
while for the latter, there are currently “two parks and four zones” in the industrial sector. The 
two parks are respectively Beiqija Industrial & Technological Park (BITP) and Hongfu 
Enterprise Park (HEP), both being among the 55 key industrial zones designated by Beijing 
Municipality and given favorable policies entitled to the national-level Zhongguan Village 
Technological Park. The BITP was established in 1992, and there were 14 enterprises in it in 
2003. The HEP was opened in 2000, now with 13 manufacturing firms operating in it. The 
four zones refer to Baimiao, Baxian, Xiejia and Ludong village-level industrial clusters, 
which totally host 73 enterprises and most are construction firms. The 4 zones at village level 
are basically very small in size and geographically scattered. 
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Table 4.4: Basic information on the industrial zones in Beiqijia in 2003 
> 10,000,000 yuan  No. of 
enterprises 
Annual output 




Two parks 27 4391.5 12 4150 
Four zones 73 4472.4 13 3580 
Other industrial 
clusters 
115 4867.3 7 3650 
Total 215 13731.2 32 11380 
Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
 
Map 4.10: Industrial land use map 
 
In the early 1990s, there was an explosive boom of development zones in China cities. Local 
governments all over the nation set up numerous development zones with titles such as 
“Economic and Technological Zone (ETDZ)”, “High Technology Development Zone” and so 
forth. According to the China State Land Administration (SLA), there were 2700 development 
zones at the end of 1992 compared to only 117 at the end of 1991 (SLA). The development 
zones have various levels of judicial approvals, ranging from central government down to 
town government, even with no approval. The central government cleans up or issues 
unfavorable policies from time to time since the mid-1990s and most recently in 2004. The 
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local governments are supposed to provide public services and infrastructure such as land 
grading, electricity and so on. In general, national development zones are better planned and 
managed than those with lower levels of approval. In 1996 vacant land in provincial-level 
zones accounted for 42.8% of total vacant land in all development zones. Those zones without 
approval had 44.2% of vacant land. A large portion of vacant land is farmland, especially in 
the Eastern Region (Deng, 2004). 
 
Table 4.5: The basic information of industrial land use in 2003 






> 10,000,000 yuan 
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Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
 
Initiated by the town government, the BITP was a town-level industrial zone approved by 
related municipal and county authorities. In 1992, the town government formulated the 
strategy to resort to land development to boost economic performance.  Accordingly, the 
fifteen-year overall development plan (1996-2010) was complied, which encapsulated the 
industrial and technological development zone plan and old village redevelopment program. 
 
The BITP obtained the in-principal approval from the Beijing Municipal Economic Planning 












BITP 305 17.79 14 881.5 3 850 
HEP 1866 21.71 13 3510.0 9 3300 
Two 
parks 
Total 2171 39.50 27 4391.5 12 4150 
Baimiao 405 16.40 15 1311.7 7 1120 
Baxian 127 10.86 12 1164.0 3 1010 
Xiejia 698 34.14 37 1785.5 3 1450 
Ludong 363 4.87 9 211.2   
Four 
zones 
Total 1593 66.27 73 4472.4 13 3580 
Pingxifu 291 9.30 13 1071.3 1 900 
Dongsanqi 446 29.97 13 947.7 2 750 
Xishage 
zhuang 
267 24.35 11 1250.0 3 1000 
Haiqingluo 334 10.13 14 1114.5 1 1000 
Nanqijia 350 44.1 14 166.5   
Beiqijia 187 8.5 10 119.0   
Yandan 160 5.63 8 68.5   
Pingfang 232 2.35 4 44.0   
Caozhan 125 4.06 8 30.0   
Lingshang 20 0.47 2 25.0   
Dongshage 
zhuang 
92 2.53 8 12.8   
Yangge 
zhuang 
63 1.27 3 11.0   
Gouzitou 10 0.17 1 5.0   




Total 2612 146.61 115 4867.3 7 3650 
TOTOAL 6376 252.39 215 13731.2 32 11380 
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Municipal City Planning Bureau both gave their approval respectively in 1992 and in 1993. 
According to the land expropriation archives in the municipal land bureau, there had been 10 
cases of land acquisition from farmers in the BITP in the period from 1992 to 2003. Before 
1997, the year when the rural land use audit was carried out in Beijing, 8 industrial sites were 
developed, in the form of leasing to manufacturers after land leveling by the management 
company. However, all of them were informal projects, without any land use approvals from 
town or higher level governments. For individual land plot, there was no approval from 
higher levels of governments, except the Changping County Economic Committee approved 
the project registration. The Beiqijia NorthAsia Industrial Technological Development Group 
(Beiqijia Industrial Group hereafter), which is subsidiary to the Beiqijia Town government, 
played a critical role in the land use dynamics of the BITP. By signing contract with and 
paying compensation fee to the local villagers, Beiqijia Industrial Group expropriated rural 
land and leased it to land-using firms directly. The compensation fee paid by the Beiqijia 
Industrial Group was RMB 10,000 or 20,000/mu, to the village collectives (village 
committees as the acting agent). The expropriated land was deemed as state land in the 
contract, so the compensation fee to the village collectives is one-off. In addition, the Beiqijia 
Industrial Group acquired the land plots in accordance with development projects, instead of 
the planning area. Such mechanism gave it saving on land cost and discretion on the timing of 
expropriation, leaving the village collectives in much disadvantage.  
 
However, after land leveling and basic infrastructure supply, the Beiqijia Industrial Group sell 
the land plot use rights to individual land users at a much higher rate on a 50-year industrial 
lease term. The land lease premiums asked by the Beiqijia Industrial Group also differed with 
various payment forms. The first form was stereotype of land lease, such as the Beijing 
Baohua Lien Computer Company plot, and the rate was RMB 250,000/ mu in 1997. 
According to the contract provisions, the Beiqijia Industrial Group was supposed to take care 
of project registration and planning approval for land leaser, as well as the infrastructure 
provision. The second rate was effective if other forms of compensation were offered by the 
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land user, e.g. the Blue Cross Biological Technology Company plot developed in 1997. On 
the basis that Blue Cross was to buy 30 housing units (3,000 sq.m.) from the Beiqijia 
Industrial Group, the land lease rate was RMB 130,000/mu, which was almost half of that in 
the above case. Obviously the Beiqijia Industrial Group would make profit from housing 
construction. The third circumstance occurred when the Beiqijia Industrial Group set up a 
subsidiary company for joint venture with external companies, and the Beijing Jiuyuan 
Liquefied Gas Company fell into this category. Indigenous company was to provide business 
space and government approvals, while Zhonghai Industrial Company, the external partner, 
was responsible for operation and management. 60% of the revenue was claimed by the 
Beiqijia Industrial Group, while the rest went to the other side. 
 
After the new institution regarding land expropriation came into effect in 2000, the individual 
land-use firms are the party which expropriates land from and compensates the local villagers, 
instead of the Beiqijia Industrial Group. There were several bans from central government on 
industrial zones during 1997 to 2003. As a result, the land approval by governments changed 
from industrial zone-based to project-based, which means land not occupied by the 
manufacturers is still belong to the peasants, but the Beiqijia Industrial Group pays an amount 
to them for an option to expropriate when necessary (author’s interview, 2005). Also the 
compensation fee paid to the village collectives increased to RMB 100,000/mu in 2003, from 
20,000/mu back in 1997.  
 
In Zhenggezhuang Village, Hongfu Enterprise Park (HEP) is opened by a formerly village 
collective enterprise, which later changed into a limited joint-stock group, Hongfu Group. So 
strictly speaking, the Hongfu Group is not a town and village enterprise. The group rents land 
from the village collective and leases it to land users, and it even made a land use plan on the 
village land. Also the group developed commercial housing, industrial, hotel and tourism 
projects. The village collective holds fixed shares of 16.6% of the group, which can not be 
sold and derive dividends every year investing in public facilities and distributing residential 
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welfare. The Group is responsible for the villagers’ employment and all the cadres are 
working in the companies under the Group, only 3 as full-time administrative staff. The 
peasant collective entrusts the village committee to manage the land, who in turn leased to the 
Group at a low rate. The welfare of villagers is better than that of other villages and they feel 
contented with such management (author’s interview, 2005). 
 
4.3.2 Rural Village Housing Land Use 
 
The conversion from agriculture land to construction land needs to follow the Overall Land 
Utilization Plan and the agricultural land conversion quota in the Land Utilization Annual 
Plan. Those who want to occupy rural land for non-agricultural construction use need to get 
approval from the municipal or district/ county government and be granted the rural collective 
land usufruct certificate. The land beyond the conversion plan needs approval from province/ 
provincial city government.  
 
Map 4.11 Rural housing land use map 
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<Beijing Regulation on Implementing “Land Administration Law”> (came into effect from 
June 1, 1991) depicts the formalities of rural construction land use. The three kinds of rural 
construction land, which are for TVEs, public welfare undertaking, and for peasant housing, 
need district/ county government to issue Collective Land Usufruct Certificate and are 
respectively controlled by annual use quota. The district/ county government is entitled to 
approve less that 2 mu arable land, or less than 10 mu other land for the three kinds of 
construction land use. Land occupation exceeding these amounts should be approved by the 
municipal government. Rural residents who conduct new housing construction should use the 
original housing land, or unoccupied land in the villages. Arable land use is strictly prohibited. 
The housing land per household should not exceed 0.25 mu in the inner suburban areas and 
0.3 mu in other areas. And using collective land for commercial development is strictly 
prohibited. 
 
There were no specific regulations on old village redevelopment, except that for the green belt 
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construction area. The general provisions are that the municipal land bureau releases annual 
land quota for villagers housing construction to the districts/ counties in suburban area, and 
those villages located in the planning city region can build village housing building according 
to the city master plan and under the approval of city planning administrative department, but 
they can not conduct land and housing commercial development. 
 
In Beiqijia Town, old village redevelopment was promoted by town government as an 
economic strategy. The houses are either occupied by the villagers not yet relocated to new 
units or rented out to floating population. Old village redevelopment is a strategic initiation 
taken by the town government. By tearing down villagers’ houses, spare land is sold to private 
development companies and companies would build commodity houses for the market, as 
well as providing separate dwelling units for the villagers. Working as coordinator in the land 
transfer process, the town government usually cooperated with the developers. In terms of the 
government approvals, there are still different commercial development types, which are 
discussed in detailed in the commercial housing section. 
 
As indicated in the demographic statistics, the number of floating population is on the 
increase, and they mainly work in the construction industry. The Dongsanqi Village on the 
south border of Beiqijia Town is a special case. Due to the existence of broadcast equipments 
nearby, development activities are not allowed beyond certain height limit. As a result, the 
villagers in Dongsanqi Village built shabby housing to the maximum land limit to 
accommodate the floating workers. Also these house are temporary and of low quality (as 
shown in the photographs below). Planning and provision of infrastructure and public 
facilities are poor, which shapely contrast with the nearby high-middle end commercial 
housing area. The difference in the tenant is dramatic as well.  
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Photo: Rural housing for rent 1 and 2 (taken by author, 2005) 
 
4.3.3 Affordable Housing Land Use 
 
There are two public projects in Beiqijia Town, which are a large-scale affordable housing 
project and an expressway construction. The basic procedure of public projects, regardless of 
land use types of welfare housing projects, infrastructure construction and other 
non-commercial projects, is similar. The land is allocated free to the developers on the 
condition that the housing price would be kept low. The developer is responsible for the 
compensations to the local villagers who were originally using the land. The town 
government representing the villagers negotiated with the developer about the compensation 
rate (author’s interview, 2005). The one-time compensation is in the form of offering them 
newly built house units on the original land, but not like the state units in the planning 
economy era, the developer does not provide employment positions to the villagers deprived 
of land. After completion, the majority of affordable housing project is sold at a subsidized 
price to the urban residents. The buys are supposed to meet some standards thus be eligible to 
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Figure 4.12 Affordable housing land use map 
 
 
Geographically the large municipal project is compact and extends continuously from another 
town to the south of Beiqijia Town, which is totally covered by the project. The yellow part at 
the southwestern of the figure 4.12 above is the affordable housing projects. In contrary to the 
piecemeal spatial pattern of the rest development, it is well-planned and spatially continuous 
with clear boundaries. The buildings are very high-density and accompanied by serious traffic 
jam. The lifestyle of the former rural residents is turned into urban type, which is typical 
top-down urbanization.  
 
In all this type of land development is relative simple in terms of actors involved and process. 
The municipal government conducts compulsory rural land expropriation and allocates it for 
free to designated developer, who is responsible to compensate the original land users 
villagers and the compensation is done by negotiation between the developer and the town 
government and is in the form of new housing units for villager households in the developed 
buildings. 
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Photo: Affordable housing project 1and 2 (taken by the author, 2005) 
 
4.3.4 Commodity Housing Land Use  
Figure 4.13: Commodity mercial housing land use map 
 
 
Due to its location of being near to built-up area, Beiqijia Town hosted many development 
projects ever since the real estate development upsurges in China in 1993/4. Besides the 
top-down force from the urban state, there are also many individual projects initiated by 
various non-government units. From the above Figure 4.13 of commodity housing land use 
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map, it can be found that the projects are scattered spatially, with huge variation in the land 
areas. Table 4.6 shows the varieties are also in terms of developers, land use approval 
authorities, and the forms of signing of land development agreement and land expropriation 
contract.  
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Table 4.6: Basic Information of Commodity Housing Projects in Beiqijia 









1 S Yan-city Garden I, 
II & III 









SOE vs municipal 
government 
Developer 
2 R Hongfu Garden 12.11 1997 Hongfu Group (TVE) Rural 
construction 
land by TVE 
NA Developer  




4 I2 Marine Fort 
Garden 
12.20 1996 Private developer 
(Longyang) 
Developer vs town 
government 
Developer; 
Pay from town 
government 






Town government  
6 I4 NorthAsia Garden 10.39 1994 Developer vs 
town-subsidiary 
Industrial Company
Town government  












8 I6 CPPCC 
Recreational 
Center 
10.726 1996 Development 






9 I7 Wenxi Apartment 13.54 
10 I8 Yuanzhongyuan 
villa 
26.32 







level or above 
Developer vs town 
government 
Developer 
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11 I9 Jingshan Primary 
School 
12.01 
12 Q1 Palace Apartment 9.14 
13 Q2 Westlake New 
Village 
10.00 1995 Private developer 
(Qianglong) 
Developer vs town 
government 
Developer vs town 
government & 
village collective 
14 Q3 Peach Garden 
Apartment /Peach 
Blossom Garden 




Developer vs town 
government 
developer 








16 Q5 Penglai Apartment/ 
Penglai Garden 
45.77 1993 













18 Q7 Wangfu Garden 32.97 1993 Private developer 
(Wangfu) 
Developer vs town 
government 
Town government 














Developer vs town 
government 
developer 
21 M1 Guanya Garden  7.71 1997 Private developer 
(Beijing Shangjian) 
22 M2 Wangdu Home 
Garden 
15.48 1999 Private developer 
(Taige) 
23 M3 Mingjia Garden 30.43 2002 Private developer 
(Jialong) 
24 M4 Meishu Holiday 
Garden 
20.26 2002 Private developer 
(Xinpujiyuan) 
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(Yufadongrui ) 
26 M6 Oriental Provence 
Villa & Laffitte 
Castle 
68.18 2002 Private developer 
(Baxian) 
27 M7 Dahua Manor 7.45 2002 Private developer 
(Dahua) 
28 M8 One Thousand 
Villa 
183.29 2003 Private developer 
(Collaboration 
between Hongfu and 
Shouchuang) 
29 M9 Vancouver Forest 71.072 2003 Private developer 
Collaboration between 
Maple Tree and Shou 
Chuang  
Note: CPPCC --- Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
The table also includes those projects not finished. The criterion is the land expropriation approval records from the municipal land bureau. 
Column “development agreement” refers to the land development cooperation agreements which are usually signed the two sides, each providing 
certain resources (production elements, such as capital and land) to accomplish the development process. In our case, the two sides are normally 
external developers/ investors versus the town governments/ subsidiary companies of town governments.  
 Column “land acquisition agreement” refers to the party who is sign land expropriation contracts with the corresponding village collectives. In our 
case, it is the external developers or the town governments/ subsidiary companies of town governments. 
 
 
Source: Beijing Municipal Land Bureau, 2005
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In a commodity housing project with the aim of pursuing profit, the developer usually is the 
most important player, who initiates and proposes projects, acquires land, motivates resources 
by cooperation and collaboration, and seeks revenue to the maximum possibility. On the other 
hand, in the land development market, developer is the demand side, which in turn induces 
land supply behaviors, accompanying land use approval and expropriation etc. Thus this 
research tries to analyze by grouping the developers firstly. Broadly speaking, the developers 
can be categorized into indigenous and external ones according to their origins, which dictate 
their accessibility to various resources and connections to the local government.  
 
• Indigenous Developers 
The first group, local developers are either development entity originated from town-village 
enterprise or town government subsidiaries. Those indigenous developers include Town and 
Village Enterprises (TVE, in this case Hongfu Group) and town-subsidiaries (Beiqijia and 
Pingxifu industrial companies, Penglai Property Company). There are 6 projects involving the 
indigenous developers, all undertaken independently. The following table includes the 
information on these 6 projects. We can find in the context below that these projects are 
illegal in the sense that they are using land not approved appropriately, some of which even 
did not have the approval from the county government, the lowest level of government with 
the authority of approval land conversion. 
 
The Beiqijia Town was merged from two towns, Beiqijia and Pingxifu, and one township, 
Yandan. The two former towns had their subsidiary industrial companies. The Beiqijia and 
Pingxifu industrial companies initialed two and one residential projects respectively, while the 
former was also the organization in charge of the development of Beiqijia Technology and 
Industrial Park (BTIP). Beiqijia Industrial Company was restructured to NorthAsia Industrial 
Group later. The NorthAsia Garden, so named of the developer, was given special and 
favorable policy package by the town government with town household registration status to 
the buyers from other provinces. 
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Table 4.7 Projects undertaken by indigenous developers 









2 R Hongfu Garden 12.11 1997 Hongfu Group 
(TVE) 
Rural construction 
land by TVE 
NA Developer  
5 I3 Spring Garden 34.69 1992 Pingxifu Industrial 
Company 
(town-subsidiary) 




6 I4 NorthAsia 
Garden 











No approval from 








16 Q5 Penglai 
Apartment/ 
Penglai Garden 
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The Hongfu Group, as discussed in the section of industrial land use, was privatized from a 
former village collective enterprise and now a sole and active developer on the village land. As 
part of the comprehensive development encompassing industrial, hotel, recreational and 
residential projects, Hongfu Garden accommodates both the workers in the vicinity and those 
commuting to city area, and villagers deprived of housing land as well. The Hongfu Garden by 
the Hongfu Group is part of Hongfu Enterprises Park area, housing both the local villagers and 
external commercial house buyers. All the projects by the town-subsidiary industrial companies 
have no approval from the governments, which means the town government was making decision 
without regulations from any higher authorities. Actually the form of town industrial companies 
was popular in the early 1990s and executed various economic initiations on behalf of the town 
government. And the fact that the town-subsidiary developers did not seek approval from higher 
governments indicates that they had privilege on the access to and control on the local land. On 
the other hand, the two projects undertaken by the Penglai Property Company had the project 
registration, land and planning approvals from the county but not the municipal government. The 
town subsidiary companies usually develop in alliance with other developers, while they just 
contribute the land and benefit. 
 
The Spring Garden, with no approval from higher governments, is a typical project by indigenous 
developer Pingxifu Industrial Company. The land expropriation contract was signed between the 
Pingxifu Town government and the villager committee in question. And it is stated clearly that the 
town government expropriates the rural land in the targeted village for the need of developing 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. After the expropriation, the village has no rights on the use 
and disposal of the land. However, actually there were another four outside investing parties. In 
the rural land use audit in Beijing in 1997, a fine is charged on the Spring Garden project. 
According to the contract between Pingxifu Industrial Companies and the four external investors, 
the external investors are to take care of the fine, which was 4,358,500 yuan, while the 
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government-linked Pingxifu Industrial Company takes the responsibility of the violation activity. 
It can be conjectured that the investors enjoyed other unstated interests from the project.  
 
Both of the two projects, NorthAsia Garden and Empire Scenery Garden, by the Beiqijia 
Industrial Company, are cooperation projects between Beiqijia Town government and external 
developers. Due to the financial collapse of the external companies, the two projects respectively 
paused at the end of 1997 and beginning of 1998. The original developer went bankrupt and 
arrested, the project was confiscated. After obtaining consent from Changping County 
government, the Beiqijia Town government took over the two projects. Both the two projects 
were approved by the county government. It is noteworthy that preferential household policy is 
given to the unit buyers, that is, people from other provinces can get household registration status 
of Beiqijia Town by buying a unit in NorthAisa Garden. While this is not in accordance with the 
official regulation, it is obvious that the town government utilize public resource inappropriately 
to promote the sale of the property, to enhance the profit derived.  
 
Both of the two projects had not gone through any approval from higher levels of authorities 
before they were audited in 1997. The land expropriation contracts were signed between the town 
governments and villager committees in both cases. It was stated that “due to the need of 
constructing socialist society of Chinese characteristics, the town government was to expropriate 
arable land from the village for real estate development”; “the lease term of the expropriated land 
was 70 years and it was to be at the town government’s disposal”; “the town governments were 
supposed to submit the state land lease premium to the ‘state’, and compensation fee to the 
village collectives”. The compensation rate was 50,000 RMB/ mu or 10,000 RMB/mu, both very 
low, respectively for the Spring Garden and NorthAsia Garden projects. 
 
Significant difference exists between town-initiated industrial companies and Penglai Property 
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Company. Penglai Property Company is a project-based developer. In China project companies 
were once booming in numbers over the country and of distinguishable characteristics. They 
resulted from certain economic opportunity and served only for short-term interest consideration. 
Most often they were joint ventures between the party which holds the resources (such as land, 
planning permit, etc), and the party which injects money to realize the profit. Penglai Property 
Company was the collaboration between Beiqijia Industrial Company and Shenzhen 
Development Technology Ltd Corp (investor). In the “Collaboration Agreement on Penglai 
Project” signed between the two parties on May 6 1994, the compensation rate to the local 
peasants was 10,000 yuan/ mu and paid by the investor. Regarding on the ownership of the 
finished buildings, it was stated on the agreement that the buildings were to belong to the 
“developer”, which is not clear. Furthermore, in the land record archive in the Municipal Land 
Bureau, the land expropriation agreement was signed on June 24 1995, which is later than the 
investment agreement, and the land use activity. This unusual sequence in the land transfer 
process indicates that the higher level decision makers, including the county government and land 
developers, overrode the rights of the actual land owner --- the local villagers. 
 
The Kangju New Village project in 1995, one year later than the Penglai New Village project, 
was collaboration between the Penglai Property Company and Pingxifu Town government. The 
land expropriation agreement was signed between the Penglai Property Company and Dongshage 
Village under Pingxifu Town in 1995. What is worthy note is that the compensation rate payable 
to the villager committee is 50,000 yuan/ mu, much higher than the 10,000 yuan/ mu in the 
Penglai New Village project only one year earlier. It is clear that this difference in compensation 
comes from the privilege on the access to land of locally originated companies. Subsidiary to the 
Beiqijia Town government, Penglai Property Company could enjoy much lower cost in land, than 
outside its geopolitical boundary.  
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z External developers 
There are various external developers who sought their fortune in the booming land development 
in Beiqijia Town. They are mainly state-owned or private development companies from outside 
the town. Through cooperation in property development or not, they have a very good 
relationship with the town government. The projects are in the name of old village redevelopment, 
by which the spare land after densification is used to develop commercial properties. The 
developers pay land premium and compensation fee, which are due to give respectively to the 
state and rural collectives living on the land, to the town/ township government. Also some 
projects have approval from county planning committee and planning bureau and managed to 
circumvent the land bureau.  
 
From the above discussed, all projects conducted by the indigenous town-subsidiary development 
companies were prior to 1997, which is the watershed in terms of urban state regulation on rural 
land use. During the same period, there were 14 projects undertaken by external development 
companies, while 7 out of 14 were approved by the county level land bureau, 1 by municipal 
government and the rest were characterized by no approval from the county level or above (see 
the below Table 4.8). However in terms of developers number in stead of project number, those 
without any approval, 4, is less than those approved by the county land bureau, 7. A case in point, 
after obtaining land use usufruct from county government and conducting the first project in 
Beiqijia Town, Zhengfa Development Company continued with another 3 projects without 
seeking any approval, with the permission of the town government. 
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Table 4.8: Projects undertaken by external developers before 1997 












1 S Yan-city Garden I, 
II & III 










SOE vs municipal 
government 
Developer 




4 I2 Marine Fort 
Garden 





Pay from town 
government 
8 I6 CPPCC 
Recreational 
Center 








9 I7 Wenxi Apartment 13.54 
10 I8 Yuanzhongyuan 
villa 
26.32 









12 Q1 Palace Apartment 9.14 





13 Q2 Westlake New 
Village 









14 Q3 Peach Garden 
Apartment /Peach 
Blossom Garden 
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Development 
Company) 























20 Q9 Celebrities 
Garden 
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Basically the external developers are either state-owned work units (SOE developers) or private 
development companies. Two projects fall into the SOE development category. The Yan-city 
Garden I, II, III cover a total area of 17.05 hectare, and continued from 1996 to 2000.These are 
actually built by the Beijing City Construction Group (BCCG) to provide housing to its workers. 
BCCG is a state work unit formed in July 1983 from army units collectively transferring to 
civilian work. BCCG is now one of the top 500 state-owned enterprises in China and one of 225 
big contractors in the world. It mainly engages in infrastructure construction contract, real estate 
development and logistics. With the increasingly profound SOE reform in China, BCGG was 
designated as one of 100 in Beijing and 120 in the country experimental units for large state 
owned enterprises reform in 1996.  
 
In August 1998, BCCG set up Housing Cooperation which provides housing for workers by 
raising money from workers. The urban housing reform stipulated that housing allocation by state 
work unit should be replaced by money subsidy system. The BCCG Housing Cooperation aimed 
to provide housing to middle-low income workers who could not afford commercial houses. The 
workers in BCCG can apply to join the housing corporation upon the approval of the housing 
reform section of the group. The members need to submit 1/3 of the house prices at the 
construction start and the rest at the completion. They can also rely on mortgage. The house 
prices are determined by the group. At the beginning in 1997 the prices were determined 
according to standard prices of housing reform, cost prices of housing reform and actual cost 
prices, and the buyers could receive 5%-20% subsidy from the group. In 2000 the actual cost 
prices were used as benchmark of prices. Till April 2000, the housing cooperation had raised 
around 200 million housing fund and provided 140,000 sq.m and more than 1400 house units in 
the Yancheng Garden I, II and III. The prices for the three phases were 1450, 1680 and 1850 
respectively in 1996, 1998 and 2000. According to the seventeenth article in the “Further deepen 
urban housing system and promote housing construction” circulated by the State Council in 1998 
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(state council, [1998] 23 ), the housing cooperation is included in the affordable housing 
construction plan, which means the land is allocated for free to the SOEs. 
(http://www.cin.gov.cn/indus/exp/2000043004.htm BCCG, April 26, 2000). 
 
The other project initiated by SOE was the CPPCC Recreational Center, which was actually a 
hotel for the use of CPPCC. The most notable characteristics of this project is the issuing process 
of land usufruct certificate, which demonstrates that CPPCC as a government authority has 
privilege on the land. In 1997 the rural land use audit was launched nationwide, during which all 
the projects in Beiqijia Town without municipal land bureau approval and hence state land 
usufruct were investigated and fined. However, it is not until 2003 when the CPPCC Recreational 
Center submitted the fine and applied for state land usufruct to municipal government. 
 
One of the projects without approvals from county level or above, a middle-sized project Marine 
Fort Garden by Longyang Development Company signed the land use contracts with both the 
town government as well as the corresponding village collective. According to the contracts, the 
developer was to submit Land Transfer Premium and Relocation Compensation Fee to the town 
government, who was then supposed to allocate an including-all fixed amount per mu to the 
village collective. The compensation fee paid to the village collective was also stipulated as 
10,000 yuan/ mu in the contract between private developer and village, which was to be 
transferred by the town government. 
 
Fazheng Development Company, whose three projects out of total four had not gone through land 
approval from county-level or above government authorities, was an active player in the land 
development of Beiqijia Town and developed more than 60 hectares during year 1994 to 1996. 
After cooperation with the town government in the first project Palace Apartment, the developer 
launched another two larger-sized residential projects and even a secondary school construction, 
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which was aimed to increase the attraction of the neighborhood and promote the selling prices of 
the following projects. Only the first project sought land approval from the county government, 
the rest three projects were all carried out under the contract with the town government. Since the 
external developers always seek the possible lowest land cost, the fee charged by the town 
government was lower than the land premium. 
 
However, although all the other three projects did not seek state land usufruct from county 
government, they did possess the approvals in terms of project registration from county economic 
planning committee and building planning permit from county city planning bureaus. The 
economic planning committee may give convenience to external development companies under 
the consideration and pressure of attracting investment and achieving local economic growth, 
while the fee paid for planning permit is very low compared to the land premium when acquiring 
the state land usufruct. As a result, if there is the county government would give acquiescence, the 
collaborating town government and external private developers would always circumvent the 
regulations and pursue highest possible profit.  
 
After the 1997 land cadastre survey and new policies application since around 2000, the control 
of municipal government is stricter. The development projects are registered by the municipal 
planning committee and project location notes are issued by the municipal planning bureau. The 
land conversion application is subject to the new regulations stated in the former text, that is, one 
note (general situation of project) and four schemes (agricultural land conversion scheme, 
agricultural land reclamation scheme, land appropriation scheme, land transfer scheme). New 
added construction land usage fee and arable land reclamation fee are respectively payable to the 
municipal government and district Land Resource Consolation Office. In addition the adjustment 
of Overall Land Utilization Plan of Beijing which was accomplished in 1998 is required.
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21 M1 Guanya Garden 7.71 1997 Private developer 
(Beijing Shangjian) 
22 M2 Wangdu Home 
Garden 
15.48 1999 Private developer (Taige)
23 M3 Mingjia Garden 30.43 2002 Private developer 
(Jialong) 
24 M4 Meishu Holiday 
Garden 
20.26 2002 Private developer 
(Xinpujiyuan) 
25 M5 Venice Garden 27 2002 Private developer 
(Yufadongrui ) 




68.18 2002 Private developer 
(Baxian) 
27 M7 Dahua Manor 7.45 2002 Private developer 
(Dahua) 
28 M8 One Thousand 
Villa 
183.29 2003 Private developer 
(Collaboration between 
Hongfu and Shouchuang)
29 M9 Vancouver 
Forest 
71.072 2003 Private developer 
Collaboration between 
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Though the land conversion process is better managed by the new institutions, the conversion 
speed by no means slowed down. All of the development projects involved overall land 
utilization plan adjustment and agricultural land reclamation. There is a very large and well 
influencing villa project named “one thousand buildings” taking up as much as 2749.35 mu 
land. This project is combined from ‘Beautiful Water Country’ by Beijing Capital Land Group 
and ‘Water Garden’ by Fuyang-hongfu Development Company, which is a project company 
jointed venture by Shanghai Fuyang Real Estate Company and Hongfu Group. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ARRANGMENTS 
 
This research is curious about how the arrangement of property rights system over the rural land 
among different actors involved, and to find out the driving forces. Development process approach is 
taken to address this issue. And this research focuses on land acquisition due to data limitation. As 
stated in the previous context, the actual development process varies from the written regulations, 
especially in terms of land use approvals. Limits on approval authority are assigned to different levels 
of governments in the formal institution, but violence of formal institutions is notoriously common in 
China. In reality the development process does not necessarily follow formalities, especially when 
governments and land bureaus at municipal and county/ district levels are involved and interplay. 
Thus land use permit from different levels of government serves as the criteria of the legal status of 
various projects. 
 
5.3 Land development legality types 
 
Firstly, projects with municipal level land use approval are deemed as legal, for example, land 
expropriation by the state and free allocated to government-linked development companies for 
municipal affordable welfare housing projects or infrastructure construction. This type is most like the 
development pattern in central planning period. As illustrated in the previous context, the state-owned 
work units housing is also approved by the municipal government and free of land premium charge. 
These two are housing construction organized by urban state and quasi-state units. Supposedly 
commodity housing or industrial projects should also obtain land conversion and use approvals from 
the municipal land bureau.  
 
However, both the municipal and county governments have the authorities to approve rural to urban 
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land conversion, except that there is a limit of 2 mu per project for county level government. 
Approvals exceeding this limit are treated as “exceeding authority” by the municipal regulators, thus 
we think it is quasi-illegal in this research. On the other hand, those projects approved by county 
government exceeding the limit are fundamentally different from those without any examination and 
permit from county or higher level governments, which involves no government regulation and thus 
are illegal.  
 
Similarly, land used within the rural sector is also differentiated as being illegal and quasi-illegal. 
According to the written regulations, rural collectives are the owners of rural land. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the regulations and criteria regarding the legality applicable to the rural land development 
are different from those regarding the conversion from rural to urban land. Renting rural land to 
external users, in which the use right is transferred under leasehold and the land ownership remained 
unchanged, is obviously illegal. Agricultural land is not allowed for market transaction to 
nonagricultural or commercial use without state expropriation and approval; only the urban state can 
transfer the rural land to urban sector and convey it to land use (China 1998, Articles 43 and 63).  
 
Peasants can use rural land for agricultural purpose, or for housing construction or industrial purpose 
on a portion of earmarked area, which is subject to county level approval and quota control in the 
meantime (China 1998, Article 61). Peasants and individual enterprises needing land for construction 
are required to submit a land use application to the village committee or the township economic entity 
for examination and to the county government for approval. Thus the legality of self-development by 
villagers or rural collectives depends on whether proper approvals from county government are 
obtained. When rural agricultural land is used for construction exceeding the quota or without 
appropriate approval, such behavior is also treated as unregulated. However, it should be treated as 
quasi-illegal if the user is individual villagers or village collectives, which is fundamentally different 
from outside land users. To put it simple, the projects are quasi-illegal in the sense that the approver 
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has the authority or the user has the right, except that the quantity limit is violated. Projects are illegal 
if there is no approval or legal basis regarding the land use behaviors. Legal status and development 
type of a specific project are actually interwoven in the sense that there are specific patterns in terms 
of the initiator, land acquisition and fund transfer process, etc.  
 
Table 5.1: Land development legality types in Beiqijia Town 
Status Description Criteria Area Initiators 





































Rural land rented 
to external users 
No approval & 
forbidden by the 
state 
Full area of 
Zhenggezhuang 
Village 
Land user, village 
collective 
Note: please refer to the figures below for the location of each group of land use 
Source: author 
 
Both the illegal and quasi-illegal projects are subjected to penalty by the municipal land bureau, but 
the rates for the two are different. Penalty for the illegal projects is 10 yuan/ sq.m. in terms of land 
area, while that of the latter is 15 yuan/ sq.m. The land conveyance fees for the illegal ones have to be 
submitted to municipal land bureau whereas that for the quasi-illegal projects submitted to the county 
government at the construction time is considered acceptable. Since the municipal land bureau is the 
authorized land management party and rule maker, its policies regarding on the two kinds of projects 
is the gauge of extent of illegality. 
 
- 80 - 
5.4 Formal projects  
 
Formal projects basically are state public projects, state-owned work units housing, or commercial 
housing and industrial projects, all of which have to be approved by the municipal government. This 
type of land development is relatively simple in terms of actors involved and land acquisition process. 
The municipal government conducts compulsory rural land expropriation and allocates it for free to 
designated developer, who is responsible to compensate the villagers. The compensation is done by 
negotiation between the developer and the town government and is in the form of new housing units  
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 A Tiantiongyuan 266 1996 Government designated 






1 S Yan-city Garden I, 
II & III 













21 M1 Guanya Garden  7.71 1997 Private developer (Beijing 
Shangjian) 
22 M2 Wangdu Home 
Garden 
15.48 1999 Private developer (Taige) 
23 M3 Mingjia Garden 30.43 2002 Private developer (Jialong) 
24 M4 Meishu Holiday 
Garden 
20.26 2002 Private developer 
(Xinpujiyuan) 
25 M5 Venice Garden 27 2002 Private developer 
(Yufadongrui ) 
26 M6 Oriental Provence 
Villa & Laffitte 
Castle 
68.18 2002 Private developer (Baxian) 
27 M7 Dahua Manor 7.45 2002 Private developer (Dahua) 
28 M8 One Thousand Villa 183.29 2003 Private developer 
(Collaboration between 
Hongfu and Shouchuang) 
29 M8 Vancouver Forest 71.07 2003 Private developer 
Collaboration between Maple 









Table 5.2: Formal Projects 
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for villager households in the developed buildings. Only 2 projects of small sizes sought 
municipal level approval before the new institution. 
 
Figure 5.1: Formal projects distribution 
 
Figure 5.2: Illustration of land rights transaction of legal projects 
 
z Property rights pattern: 
The ownership of village collectives over rural land is limited in use types and with 
contingency, i.e. subject to discretionary expropriation decision of the urban state, usually the 
municipal government. The urban state acquires rural land to convey to private developers on 
leasehold in exchange of land conveyance fee. In this transaction process, land ownership is 
Private Developer
Municipal Government Village collectives 
State Land Usufruct 
Land Ownership  
Conveyance Fee 
Town government Compensation Fee
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shifted from rural to urban, and use rights further to private developers, while the rural 
collectives receive compensation in return. By negotiating with external developers on behalf 
of subordinated rural villages, the town government is acting as the official supervisor of rural 
collectives and financially interlinked with the collectives regarding compensation fee.  
 
5.2 Quasi-informal projects 
 
5.2.1 Commodity projects with county level approval  
 
From the following Table 5.2, in the commodity housing projects approved by the county 
government, majority of the developers (8 out of 9) are external private developers, while the 
remaining one is town-subsidiary. While all the external development companies sign the 
project development agreements with the town government or town-subsidiary industrial 
companies beforehand, only 4 of them signed the rural land expropriation contracts with 
village collectives. The land acquisition contracts of the projects in which the external 
developer collaborates with town-subsidiary industrial company, or alternatively the 
developer being town-subsidiary itself, were between the town-subsidiary industrial 
companies and the village collectives. What is more, in 2 of the projects, the town 
government “acquires” the land from villages in stead of the external developers. Also it can 
be found that all the projects were developed during 1994-1996, when the market was hectic 
and all sought to benefit from it. 
 
In addition, in the land transfer process, the town government usually functions as an official 
agent and service hub when dealing with the developers. It negotiates with the private 
developers and collects land premium, from which it pays the land conveyance fee to the 
county government, and decides the amount to return to the village collectives as 
compensation. Part of the land premium is turned in to the county government, who issues the 
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State Land Usufruct Certificate once the land conveyance fee is paid. And 30%-60% of the 
land expropriation fee would be returned to the town government as its revenue (Author’s 
interview, 2005). At the same time, some of the village collectives still had not got the 
compensation till the author’s fieldtrip (author’s interview, 2005). In a word, the town 
government is actually managing the rural land under its jurisdiction.  
 
The town government either adopted co-development strategy with the private development 
companies who are interested in the land, or the private developers undertaking the 
development by themselves on the top that land premium is paid. The extent and forms of 
cooperation between the town government and external funds by the form of joint ventures 
vary greatly. The Beiqijia town-subsidiary Penglai Property Development Company started in 
1994 Penglai Village by the cooperation of Beiqijia Industrial Company and Shenzhen Kaifa 
Technological Joint Stock Company. Later in 1995 the new company independently initialed 
another residential project Kangju New Village.  
  




To assist the town government or the private developers shift the rural land to urban sector, 
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conveyance fee is the strong incentive for the revenue-driven county government. The town 
government adopted the “old villages redevelopment and new village construction” policy 
and compiled a master plan as guideline for development. During the 1990s, large area of 
agricultural land is converted to residential housing, in which process the town government 
played a critical role. From the above discussed, the town government serves as a middleman, 
liaising with the private developers, the county government, and the village collectives as the 
only channel between them. More importantly, the town government not only represent the 
village collectives as the owners when negotiating for compensation, but also behaves 
actively by acquiring the land and conduct development projects. 
 
According to the formal institutions, the land acquirers who sign the land expropriation 
contracts with village collectives are supposed to be the urban governments, or the private 
developers, on behalf of the urban state as authorized. However, in the case area, either the 
town government or town-subsidiary companies act as the land acquirers. With the assistance 
from county government, such expropriation behaviors change the ownership of rural land to 
state-owned, evidenced by the issued state land usufruct. However, the town government’s 
land “expropriation” is informal for it is not an urban state, but due to the ambiguity of rural 
land ownership, the town government is actually “calling back” the whole ownership over 
rural land by paying to the village collectives and solely use or convey the land use rights. In 
other words, without the involvement of the county government, the one converting land 
ownership from rural to urban sector by issuing the state land usufruct, the acquisition by 
town government is actually the fighting for ownership, within the rural sector. 
 
z Property rights pattern: 
As discussed above, the county government is shifting the rural land to urban sector for land 
conveyance revenue, which motivates it to exceed the approval authority. It is the town 
government acting as the middleman during the land transfer process, by negotiating with the 
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external private developer, collect land premium, submit conveyance fee and compensate the 
village collectives. This makes the town government as the key actor. Also it represents as the 
rural collectives, the owner of rural land by negotiating with external actors. 
 
What is more, the town government and its subsidiaries acquire the rural land from village 
collectives, or even develop the land after acquisition. Before the land ownership is converted 
to state-owned by the county government, such expropriation behavior basically does not 
change the ownership, that is to say, is within the rural sector and land remains 
collective-owned. The difference lies in the re-definition of “collective” --- whether is village 
level or town level. The historical ambiguity of the ownership over rural land gives birth to 
such space for manipulation by town government, with the help of the higher administrative 
status in the hierarchy political system. 
 
The village collectives, which are subordinated to the town government, are deprived the 
ownership over rural land passively in the sense that such land expropriation behavior by the 
town government is not blessed by the formal institutions. However it arises from the 
ambiguity of the rural land property rights distribution between village collectives and town. 
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Table 5.3: Projects using land approved by the county government 












12 Q1 Palace Apartment 9.14 1994-1996 Private developer 
(Fazheng) 
Developer vs town 
government 
Developer 
13 Q2 Westlake New 
Village 
10.00 1995 Private developer 
(Qianglong) 
Developer vs town 
government  
Developer vs town 
government & village 
collective 
14 Q3 Peach Garden 
Apartment /Peach 
Blossom Garden 




Developer vs town 
government 
developer 







16 Q5 Penglai Apartment/ 
Penglai Garden 
45.77 1993 












18 Q7 Wangfu Garden 32.97 1993 Private developer 
(Wangfu) 
Developer vs town 
government 
Town government 















Developer vs town 
government 
developer 
Note: Q stands for quasi-informal 
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5.2.2 Rural land used by peasants 
 
Dongsanqi Village is the nearest village to the large-scale affordable housing community and 
adjacent to the expressway. Due to the building height limitation near radio launcher, no 
commercial real estate redevelopment is allowed. The villagers use their housing land to build 
shabby houses for small shops or rent to floating population, mostly construction workers. 
The buildings are mostly one-story and very high-density. Actually all the land is used by 
individual peasants, who obviously use their housing land exceeding the limitation stipulated 
by the municipal government.  
 
Figure 5.4 Illustration of transaction of peasant housing rent 
 
z Property rights pattern: 
The ownership of village collectives over rural land remains unchanged, but the restriction on 
agricultural land use is violated without approval from county level government. All the 
levels of government keep acquiescence towards this illegal utilization, due to the 
development limitation by the radio. The regulation is liberated if it is not available for 






Individual villagers Village collectives 
Land Ownership 
Rental 
Land Use Right 
(member)
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Figure 5.5: Quasi-informal projects distribution 
 
 
5.4 Informal projects  
 
5.4.1 Commercial projects with no approval 
 
The informal projects refers to those using land which even did not have the approvals from 
the county government, the lowest government level with the authority of approval land 
conversion. Different from the previous two groups, the informal projects comprise both 
residential commercial projects and industrial commercial projects for rent. 
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Table 5.4 Informal projects 














2 I2 Marine Fort 
Garden 
12.20 1996 Private developer 
(Longyang) 
Developer vs town 
government 
Developer; 
Pay from town 
government 
3 I3 Spring Garden 34.69 1992 Pingxifu Industrial 
Company 
(town-subsidiary) 
Developer vs Pingxifu 
Industrial Company 
Town government  
4 I4 NorthAsia Garden 10.39 1994 Developer vs 
town-subsidiary 
Industrial Company 
Town government  











6 I6 CPPCC 
Recreational 
Center 
10.73 1996 Development company 





7 I7 Wenxi Apartment 13.54 
8 I8 Yuanzhongyuan 
villa 
26.32 
9 I9 Jingshan Primary 
School 
12.01 







level or above 
Developer vs town 
government 
Developer 
Note: I stands for illegal 
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a. residential commercial projects 
It turns out that developers conducting illegal projects are mainly two types. One group is the 
industrial companies subsidiary to town governments, conducting 3 out of 9 informal projects 
(table 5.4). Being non-professional development companies, they usually develop in alliance 
with outside investment companies, while they just contribute the land and benefit from final 
profits. In 2 of the projects, the town government companies signed land expropriation 
contracts with village collectives and compensate them accordingly. The Spring Garden 
developed by Pingxinfu Town Industrial Company was started constructed in 1992, but the 
land expropriation contract was signed in 1998. The Beiqijia Town Industrial Company, has 
two residential projects and eight industrial plots in Beiqijia Industrial Park, the latter being 
discussed in the following section. Both of the residential projects encountered financial 
collapse of the investment companies, thus were managed by the town government. To 
promote the sale of two projects, the town government uses town hukou as incentives to 
people from other provinces.  
 
The other type of developers is state-owned or private development companies from outside 
the town, 3 of them as Beijing Fazheng Industry Company, and Longyang Development 
Company and developer subsidiary to CPCCC. The Zhengfa Industry Company has 4 projects 
in Beiqijia Town, including apartments, villas and primary school and formed a large 
community. The Marine Fort Garden by Bejing Longyang Development Company is also a 
large project (163 mu). The project Recreational Center by Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) first was on a 70-year lease of 160 mu agricultural land at 
a high rate of 2.7 million RMB in 1993, in which 240,000 was paid to the town government 
for Rural Collective Land Usufruct. In 1997, after obtaining the approval of project 
registration from County Planning Committee and Project Planning Permit from County 
Planning Bureau, CPPCC put the land into construction without any land conversion permit.  
 
Although there is no approval from county or higher level governments, land expropriation 
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contracts are still signed between rural collectives and developers/ town government, which is 
not much different from the quasi-illegal projects in this sense. Based on the land 
development agreements between developers and town governments, the developers work in 
alliance with the town government. Thus, the role of town government is far more significant 
than that in quasi-informal projects, due to the absence of assistance from county government 
and valid state land usufruct. Since there is no state land usufruct for a residential project, the 
buyers of the housing units can not obtain the housing ownership certificate, while in reality 
receipt of housing purchase are used instead.  
 
b. industrial properties for sale and renting 
 
The Beiqijia Technology and Industrial Park (BITP) is a town-level industrial zone. Founded 
in 1992, it is managed by the Beiqijia Town Industrial Company. The company conducted 8 
plots of illegal land expropriation during 1992 to 1997 and took up around 150 mu land 
(approximately 10 hectares). The land was expropriated from villagers at compensation rate 
of 20,000 RMB/mu and transferred it to firms at 250,000 RMB/ mu on a 50-year lease 
(author’s interview). The contracts of land expropriation were signed between Beiqijia Town 
Industrial Company and village committees. However, by 2000 when these projects were 
handled by the municipal government, only part of the compensation fees supposed to be paid 
to the village committees were realized (author’s interview, 2005). 
  
Figure 5.6: Illustration of the land transaction in the informal commercial projects 
 
Private Developer 
Town Government  
Village collectives 
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z Property rights pattern: 
Compared with the quasi-informal commercial projects, the difference lies in that there is no 
conversion of rural land to urban land, that is to say, it remains collectively-owned. However, 
indeed there is land transfer process within the rural sector before conveyance for 
development. It is clearly shown that, again the town government is the key actor in taking 
the land ownership from village collectives by compensating them as low as the urban state 
does. The town government rides on the ownership ambiguity and takes full share of 
ownership in a illegal and deceitful way, without the assistance of county government. 
 
5.4.2 Rural Land Rent to External Users 
 
Renting rural land to external users is prohibited by the land law. However, in the inner 
peri-urban area, where land development process is very dynamic and vibrant, illegal land 
lease to external user for development is pervasive. Commonly seen types of collective land 
usufruct lease structures are list as follows:  
9 Lease the collective land usufruct 
 The lease period is relatively short (5-10 years) and leasers receive annual rate 
9 Transfer the collective land usufruct 
 The land is transferred on 70/50-year leasehold and leasers receive one-off rate 
9 Lease or transfer properties built on collective land 
Peasant housing land is often transferred in this way and one-off house prices are paid. 
9 TVEs co-operate with other enterprises using collective land usufruct as shares  
The collective economic organizations are not attached to the operation or business risk 
of the enterprises 
9 TVEs land usufruct is transferred when mortgaging their properties or merged with other 
enterprises 
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In the Zhenggezhuang Village in our case study, village collective cooperates with external 
enterprises using rural land usufruct as shares. As we find out in the survey, the land user 
Hongfu Group was actually formally a Town and Village Enterprise (TVE), but later 
privatized. Such direct and connection made it a conclusive land renter in its originated 
village. Zhenggezhuang Village has the land lease contract with Hongfu Group, and the 
village collective holds fixed shares of 16.6% of the group, which can not be sold to other 
organizations. By this agreement, the village collective derives dividends every year from the 
Group and invests in public facilities and residents’ welfare. The villagers entrust the village 
collective to manage the land, who in turn leased to the Group at a low rate. The Group is 
responsible for the villagers’ employment and all the cadres are working in the companies 
under the Group, only 3 as full-time administrative staff. The starter and chairman of the 
Hongfu Group is formerly the chairman of Gouzitou village committee. 
 
The Hongfu Group accumulated its capital through construction business, and later venture 
into real estate development. It even made a spatial plan on the village land, and rhe 
development plan includes commercial housing, industrial, hotel and tourism projects. The 
industrial park, Hongfu Enterprise Park (HEP) is leased to individual plant after leveling and 
infrastructure construction.  
 
In the rural-urban land conversion, land ownership and title changed with the change of land 
use from agricultural to urban. This process is dominated by a top-down mechanism, while 
the villagers are passive and got nothing else except compensation fee paid to the village 
collective committees. The village collectives are responsible for the villagers’ welfare but 
employment is out of their capacity. Most of villagers have to look for work themselves 
(author’s interview, 2005). The former town and village enterprise and the village collective 
conduct a reciprocal corporation. With the land as equity shares in the group, the sustainable 
welfare and employment opportunities are provided to villagers. The author finds that the 
welfare of villagers is better than that of other villages and they feel contented with such 
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management (author’s interview, 2005). 
 
Figure 5.7: Illegal projects distribution 
 
Figure 5.8 Illustration of the land rights transaction in renting land to external users 
 
 
z Property right arrangement 
In this type of land use, municipal, county or town government are not involved. 
Although it is illegal, it demonstrates the straightforward implication of ownership on 
rural land by village collectives, with the ability to derive income and distribute to the 
member villagers. Ownership remains intact and use rights are leased out. 
External land users 
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5.5 Summery 
 
Beiqijia is a typical peri-urban town in Beijing and a hotspot of real estate development in the 
last decade of market upsurge. It has witnessed complicated rural land development process 
and the evolution of development types. The examination of Beiqijia’s experience can thus 
shed light on rural land redevelopment features in peri-urban Beijing and other China cities. 
During the land development process, municipal governments, town governments and their 
subsidiaries, private developers, and villagers behaved strategically and interacted with others. 
Special features of the urban redevelopment are observed. 
 
a. Rapid land development over different regulation periods (time dimension) 
 
In a short period of 10 years, Beiqijia Town developed over 20 km2 land area, originated from 
an agricultural town. More than 60% of the developed area is residential and around 15% of it 
is industrial use. From the previous context, it is known that the turning point of state 
regulation on rural land use is 1997-2000 in the form of new institutions and stricter control. 
Thus in Beiqijia, among the total 29 commercial residential projects, only 7 are undergone 
after 2000, while the rest 22 were finished before 2000. However, in terms of land area, the 7 
projects after 2000 take up 407.682 hectares, which is 52.23% of the total commercial 
residential development.  
  
Figure 5.9: Comparison between commercial housing projects before and after 1997 
Comparison between before and after 1997
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The implication of this result is obvious. Although new institutions came into effect and the 
regulations from higher levels of governments are stricter, the land development pace by no 
means slows down. On the other hand, in the sense that there are fewer players in the market, 
implied by the much fewer numbers of projects, the land market is better controlled, which 
means that the precious land resource is less accessible than before, and the control power and 
development rights are more concentrated.  
 
b. Violation of the formal regulations is pervasive (land use approval) 
 
From the perspective of land use approval from various levels of government authorities, 
violation of the formal institution is discussed. Aside from the Yancity Garden approved by 
municipal government and Hongfu Garden on the rural construction land, the rest are evenly 
(9, 9, 9) grouped into three types, i.e. with no approval, approval from county government and 
approval from municipal government. The land development areas undertaken within the 
three groups are respectively 130.386 hectares, 190.07 hectares, and 430.872 hectares, that is, 
16.7%, 24.4% and 55.2% of the total residential area. It is obvious that average parcel for 
projects with higher level approval, i.e. municipal government approvals versus the other two, 
are much larger. In other word, the municipal government is responsible for more than half of 
the commodity residential development area in this region. Here rises a question of extent of 
secure development rights. Given the unmet demand, the developers would actually develop 
as much land as they feel secure, since the developers are also aware of the illegality of no 
approval or approvals exceeding authorities. 
 
Table 5.5: Comparison of projects with different land approvals 
  No 
approval  
Approval from county 
government 
Approval from municipal 
government 
No. 9 9 9 
Area (hectare) 130.39 190.07 430.87 
Percentage (%) 16.7 24.4 55.2 
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c. Town government act as a special land acquirer 
It is noteworthy that in Beiqijia Town, the town governments or their subsidiary industrial 
companies also act as the acquirers of rural land, signing the agreement with their subordinate 
administrative units, rural collectives. There are in total 7 such cases, while 3 of them (49.28 
hectares) without any land use approvals and 4 of them (140.11 hectares) with approvals from 
Changping County government. For such projects, the actual developers are external private 
developers or town-subsidiary companies, that is, the town governments is expropriating the 
rural from peasant for its own commercial development or convey it to the private sector, like 
an urban state. By making decisions alone or obtaining consent from the county government, 
the town government was playing a very active and important role in the land conversion.  
 
5.5 Major Players 
 
There are several important actors emerging from the complex land development process. 
They are various levels of governments (state, municipal, county/ district, town), village 
collective cadres, private developers, local villagers, and commercial housing buyers in this 
region.  
 
a. commercial housing buyers 
The housing prices here is very low compared to those in city regions under normal 
development procedures. The lower prices drove the demand and thus the supply, which is 
also driven by land revenues and profits. For the illegal development projects, the buyers get a 
membership of so-called “cooperative housing building group” set by the developers and they 
actually use the receipt of housing purchase is the certificate of house ownerships. 
Supposedly such property ownership is insecure and subject to the state’s penalty or even 
confiscation. However, in the interviews the author found that they are not at all worried 
about the illegal status of their housing property. As Zhu (2004) indicates that in the urban 
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area, the land users could hold tight to its land and the state could hardly retrieve the allocated 
assets owners under the socialist property rights. The perception that government would take 
action against existing house owners supports the demand for illegal commodity houses. 
 
b. local villagers 
 
In the rural-urban land conversion, land ownership and title changed with the change of land 
use from agricultural to urban. This process is dominated by a top-down mechanism, while 
the villagers are passive and got nothing else except compensation fee paid to the villager 
committees. The village collectives are responsible for the villagers’ welfare but employment 
is out of their capacity. Most of villagers have to look for work themselves (author’s interview, 
2005). The former town and village enterprise and the village collective conduct a reciprocal 
corporation. With the land as equity shares in the group, the sustainable welfare and 
employment opportunities are provided to villagers. 
 
Land is what peasants make living on. To the villagers, there is not much difference about 
who is expropriating the land from them and what for. The compensation rate is prescribed 
and the employment is a serious problem to them after the deprival of land. In 2002 the work 
force in Beiqijia Town is 8982, and the distribution among three sectors is 37.4%, 28.3% and 
18.3%. The rest went out the town to make a living. Their education backgrounds are 
worrisome, 84.6% of the work force is below secondary school education level, 11.8% 
received high school education, 2.5% went to collage and only 1.1% is above collage level. 
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Table 5.6: Employment situation of villagers in Beiqijia Town in 2003 
Source: Beiqijia Town government, 2003 
c. Private developers 
The developers usually act as investor driven by low land prices and voluminous profit 
margin in this area. Loose management and pro-development local government formed 
informal institutions which fostered booming investment activities. What is notable is that 
there are relatively few developers in comparison to the number of projects. Some developers 
each have several projects in the town. Firm relationship between developers and local 
government can be seen.  
 
d. State government 
Although the state government is not directly involved in the development of Beiqjia Town, 
all the formal policies and regulations over rural land use are compiled by the state 
government. Supposedly, the state government is concerned with agricultural land protection 
and state food security. However, lack of implementation mechanism of these restrictive 
regulations made them ineffective. The central government is transigent to the informal 
development. It knows by any means but it did not take any actions until there was a danger 
sign as to the national security. 
 
Category population Percentage (%) 
Total 8982 100 
Primary sector (agriculture) 2538 28.3 
Secondary (industrial) 1645 18.3 
Tertiary 3348 37.4 
Construction 357 4 
Transportation and storage 364 4 In which 
Commercial and catering  2627 29.4 
Go out of town to seek a job 1406 16 
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e. Municipal government 
The municipal government is a developmental state for it did not take actions on the informal 
development until there is requirement from the central government. Besides land revenues, 
official performance by the higher levels of government which is measured by economic 
growth rates and urban physical changes. After the restrictive policy came into effect, the 
municipal government retrieved the approval power on land conversion. However, the land 
development pace by no means slowed down, which indicates the municipal government also 
stresses the revenue generated by land lease, rather the agricultural land protection, which is 
used to justify the hierarchical approval system. 
 
f. Town government 
The town government is the most active player in the informal development process for the 
sake of revenue retention as it has a level of fiscal system. From 1992, the town government 
adopted land development strategy to promote economic performance and made a fifteen-year 
overall development plan (1996-2010) in 1995. In the plan, two land development methods 
were identified, that is, old village redevelopment and town industrial park. Old village 
redevelopment is mainly to lease land to the market by densification of peasants’ housing. 
The Beiqijia Town Industrial Park is a town-level industrial development zone approved by 
related authories at county and municipal level. The municipal planning committee agreed the 
proposal in principal, the municipal urban planning bureau issued the location note of planned 
industrial land, and Changping County planning committee approved the project registration 
of Beiqijia Town Industrial Park in 1992 and the following industrial plots. By cooperation 
with external developers, as well as conducting development directly, the town government 
initiates and promotes the local land development market.  
 
g. Village cadres 
In the collective production period, due to their own benefit, the production brigade cadres 
would negotiate with higher level of government on the retention of products. The 
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abolishment of commune system gave decision making rights on production to the peasants 
on the one hand, resulted in differentiation between interests of peasants and cadres. The 
incomes of cadres now rely on the fiscal revenue, either expropriated from peasants or other 
resources.  
 
After taking over governance over the country, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
established government power deep into the countryside and succeed in building a top-down 
political system. Siu (1989) holds that the local cadres get power from the party and higher 
level of governments and act on the ideology and policy guidelines of the party. They are 
agents of the party and state, not representing the interest of villagers. But Oi (1989) thinks 
that local cadres are both the agents of the state, and also representatives of the local interests. 
Through clintelism, the local cadres can archive a balance between state, villagers and their 
own interests. In reality, with the devolution and decentralization of government power and 
fiscal system, the lower levels of government and cadres are more and more the main players 
confronting and conflicting with the peasants. 






With urban development process viewed as the market result of a special commodity, 
buildings or real estate, insightful explanations regarding land development proliferate. 
Neo-classical economics holds that the real estate market is also one dominated by individuals 
who behave rationally in maximising utilities with preference, with relative prices driving the 
market towards a long-run equilibrium. However, the real estate market is notoriously 
inefficient and the neo-classical model is widely criticized (Evan, 1995). Thus development 
process approach is put forth to study the forces and their function in shaping the urban built 
environment, suggesting that a thorough understanding of the development process can be 
achieved only by linking the strategies, interests and actions of various actors with the context 
of broader social, economic and political processes. Yet, Ball (1998) argues that such 
approach enriches empirical knowledge but lacks theoretical backup. On the other hand, Zhu 
(2005) holds that the ‘structure’ in the development process thesis is the institution of 
property rights, and elaborates on how socialist institution of people’s landownership has 
evolved into a new form to structure an emerging urban land market. 
 
In spite of drastic institutional change in rural China, there is no institutional research on the 
rural land in China, although Ho (2004) points out the legal ambiguity of rural land property 
rights. But how various actors react to such ambiguity and economic and institutional changes, 
and how distinctive peri-urbanization occurs, remain unsolved.  
 
In the context of property rights and institutional change, the research question is thus derived 
as what is the informal development of rural land in peri-urban area of Beijing and what is the 
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property rights arrangement among various actors. This research aims to find out the property 
rights on rural land during the rural-state conversion process and the driving forces for this 
outcome.  
 
Taking Beiqijia Town, a typical peri-urban town in Beijing, as the study area, data were 
collected from land bureau archival record, field reconnaissance surveys and interviews with 
local officers and villagers. Based on the data, development process approach, with the focus 
on land acquisition process, is carried on for analysis on the property rights inherited by 




6.2.1 Complicated informal development  
 
This research is preliminarily inspired and motivated by the wide-spread geographical 
phenomenon --- peri-urbanization, and accordingly tries to interpret it from the perspective of 
land development process. First of all, policies and regulations regarding rural land use and 
conversion are reviewed, providing the background of formal institutions, against which 
analysis on actual activities could be conducted. Secondly, records of rural land expropriation 
issued by the Municipal Land Bureau are scrutinized. As revealed in the previous context, 
most of development projects are informal in the sense that they lacked appropriate approval 
for rural land expropriation issued by the municipal authority, since there is limit on the 
approval authority of the county government. In the meantime, investigation is also carried on 
the rural construction land use in the same manner. Thirdly, at this conjunction land use 
permit from different levels of government serves as the criteria of the legal status of various 
projects, which helps to reveal the various actors and their interactions for further analysis. 
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There are three categories of development in terms of legality, i.e. being approved 
appropriately. Projects with municipal level land use approval are deemed as legal, for 
example, land expropriation by the state and free allocation to government-linked 
development companies or the state-owned work units housing, that is, urban state and 
quasi-state units. All commodity housing or industrial projects which obtain land conversion 
and use approvals from the municipal land bureau are also legal.  
 
Alternatively development could be approved by the county government, with 2 mu per 
project limit, or not approved by the two levels of governments. Projects approved by the 
county government exceeding this limit are also treated as quasi-illegal in this research, while 
those without any approvals are illegal. The way of thinking is that county government 
approvals exceeding the limit are fundamentally different from those without any examination 
and permit from county or higher level governments.  
 
Similarly, land used within rural sector is also differentiated as being illegal and quasi-illegal. 
Renting rural land to external users is obvious illegal, for agricultural land is not allowed for 
market transaction to nonagricultural or commercial users without state expropriation and 
approval; only the urban state can transfer the rural land to urban sector and convey it to land 
use. Peasants can use rural land for agricultural purpose, or for housing construction or 
industrial purpose on a portion of earmarked area, which is in the meantime subject to county 
level approval and quota control. The legality of self- development by villagers or collectives 
thus depends on whether proper approvals from county government are obtained or not. When 
rural agricultural land is used for construction exceeding the quota or without appropriate 
approval, such behavior is also treated as illegal. However, it is treated as quasi-illegal if the 
user is individual villagers or village collectives, which is fundamentally different from 
external land users. To put it simple, the projects are quasi-illegal in the sense that the 
approver has the authority or the user has the right, except that the quantity limit is violated. 
Projects are illegal if there is no approval or legal basis regarding the land use behaviors.  
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It is found in this research that the quasi-illegal and illegal land development is pervasive in 
Beiqijia Town, especially before the major state regulation in 1997. Quasi-illegal and illegal 
land development is the reason fostering peri-urbanization process, which is characterized by 
unplanned and unregulated piecemeal land use. 
 
6.2.2 Various actors and interactions 
 
Based on the categorized development, projects are scrutinized in great detail, in an attempt to 
derive insights on the key actors, their strategic behaviours and interactions. Clarification of 
the major players and their ways of extracting benefit from rural land development virtually 
reveals the property rights arrangement among them. Given clearly stated and legally 
protected property rights definition, any forms of informal land development would not 
emerge easily. Explorative study on the responses and reactions taken by the player when 
facing ambiguity clarifies the implication of such ambiguity. 
 
For the formal development projects, the main actors are undoubtedly the municipal 
government, developers and rural peasants. By compensating the peasants at predefined rate 
and paying conveyance fee to the municipal government as request, the ownership of rural 
land converted to urban state ownership and leased land use right. In this model, the rural 
collectives’ ownership is restricted in land use and with contingency to terminate, i.e. the 
discretional expropriation decision made by the urban state. Also such arrangement is in 
accordance with the formal or written institutions.  
 
In the quasi-informal development projects group, there are two situations where there is 
conversion of rural to urban land or not. If the land expropriation approved by exceeded 
authorities and conveyance to private developers are done, there is land ownership transfer 
from rural sector to urban sector. While county government is motivated by the land 
conveyance fee as revenue source, the town government also emerges as a key actor by 
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representing the rural collectives in negotiating with the private development on 
compensation, collecting and paying the conveyance fee etc. What is noteworthy is that there 
are rough standards respectively for the conveyance fee and compensation rate. By 
negotiating and providing services to the private developers, the town government also aims 
at the residual revenue after deducting the above mentioned two items of fee. Since the 
compensation to the village collectives are roughly same with in the formal development, 
only town government is better off from the rural land conversion within the rural region.  
 
For the development by individual peasants and renting to external users by village 
collectives, the land ownership is not transferred, and thus the right to extract benefit remains 
in the village collectives.  
  
6.2.3 Competition within the collective over land  
 
The Chinese Constitution stipulates that ‘‘Land in rural and suburban areas, except for that 
stipulated by laws as being owned by the state, is collectively owned by rural residents’’ 
(China 2004, Article 10). In the pre-reform era, the ownership of the means of production – 
agricultural fields, farm animals, implements and so forth – was refashioned in a “three-level 
ownership”, i.e. the people’s commune, the production brigade and the production team. The 
production team was identified as the primary accounting unit and the owner of land in 1962. 
This rural land system established at that time was then carried on until the demise of 
commune system in 1983 and production team was further transformed into natural village. 
 
However, it is not specified in the legal documentations that which level of administrative unit 
is the so-called “rural collective”, whether it is town government, administrative village 
committee, or natural village. Historically the former counterparts of the three levels owned 
all the productive resources commonly, for the sake of organizing agricultural production. 
Nowadays the land is increasingly becoming important resource of revenue, no longer a 
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farming means. Such indeterminacy of rural land owner becomes serious problem with the 
increasing economic value of land.  
 
It is shown in the research that the town government is playing a very important role in 
initiating, coordinating, coalition with external developers, while comprising the interest of 
rural collectives. Based on the previous analysis, the role of the town government is succinct. 
On the one hand, it serves a hub when dealing with the external developers, representing the 
village collectives for negotiation of compensation, collecting land conveyance fee for the 
approval government. This means that it actually manages the land resource within its 
administrative boundary. On the other hand, the town government and its subsidiaries 
expropriate land from the village collectives, and either conveys it to external developers or 
conducts development by itself. Such expropriation behaviour is illegal, and is the strategic 
response in face of the ambiguity regarding rural land ownership. The indetermination of 
so-call “rural collectives”, along with the political power on the subordinated villages, makes 
the town government the key player in rural land development market.  
 
Although the key player is the town government as shown in the previous context, there are 
still exceptions in terms of the development types, where the village collective and individual 
villagers also play the predominant role in land use. There are two cases in our Beiqijia Town 
research area. One is Zhenggezhuang Village, which rents all land within administrative 
boundary to external land users. By planning and developing the village’s land 
comprehensively, the land user Hongfu Group also takes care of the whole village’s welfare. 
In Dongsanqi Village, on the other hand, the individual villagers develop the land by 
themselves. Without land ownership being transferred in the development process, why the 
two cases are different from all others in terms of the land development types? For the 
Zhenggezhuang case, there is an ongoing scheme on the land use, which is initiated by the 
rural collective and not intervened by the town government. Similarly, in Dongsanqi Village 
there is no control on the villagers’ housing building, which obviously exceeded the housing 
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slot regulation, from the town government.  
 
Here arises the issue of fighting for development rights on rural land. If the villages have 
justifiable reasons, which could be better development scheme or restriction on construction, 
the town government would loose the intervention, given the subject villagers could take care 
of themselves. Thinking it reversely, if the town government could not provide better 
solutions than the subject villages already have, it would be difficult for it to step in the land 
use issue, otherwise there surly will be complaints. The author would conclude that the village 
collectives’ ownership on land is with contingency and severely restricted by the urban state. 
However there is bargaining process on the development rights between the rural sector and 
the higher regulators. 
 
6.3 Summary of the conclusions 
 
Power balance and interaction among the land users, developers and the state were always 
structured by the property rights of the actors (Webster & Lai, 2003). As shown in the case 
study, there are various forms of land development, in terms of land transfer and approval 
grants, as well as various developers. In the author’s point of view, ambiguity in property 
rights is vital in the phenomena, and a driving force of rapid peri-urbanization. The ambiguity 
regarding rural land rights arises from legal basis (Ho, 2004), one being the indetermination 
of the actual land owner, which in turn induced dynamic fighting process for the land 
ownership and bound benefit. It has been revealed in this research that rural land development 
of Beiqijia Town was structured by the ambiguous legal ownership of rural land by the rural 
collectives, weak land use rights of the nominal land owners, indetermination of property 
rights allocation within rural sector.  
 
6.4 Further discussion 
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Given the fast pace of urban growth and dynamic nature of peripheral urban areas, the 
significance of the research on land conversion is self-evidence. This research is curious about 
the driving forces behind the so-called “peri-urbanization” phenomenon which is commonly 
seen in outskirt of Chinese cities. On top of development process analysis, what can be 
summarized or derived are the major relevant actors, strategies they take and resultant 
interactions among them. Then the property rights come into fore and explain the 
“peri-urbanization” phenomenon from institutional perspective. Deviation of the de facto 
property rights from the written formal rule, and various forms of ambiguity, largely resulted 
in the unregulated land development. The finding of the research may serve as an updated 
account of institutional changes on rural land use in China, as well as provide basis for further 
discussion and academic research. Further studies may include how to improve the 
enforcement of regulations, and thus the efficiency of land use. 
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